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Articles 
Corporations as Semi-States 
JAY BUTLER* 
When Ebola came to West Africa in 2014, Liberia 
could not cope.  The State’s already fragile public 
health infrastructure was largely ineffective in re-
sponding to the illness and preventing its spread.  
And, the World Health Organization’s support was 
slow and stilted.  By contrast, Firestone, a tire com-
pany that operates a vast rubber plantation in Liberia 
and runs its own hospital for 80,000 employees, family 
dependents, and persons in neighboring localities, re-
sponded to the virus much more effectively. 
This Article uses Firestone’s Ebola response as an en-
try point to study a phenomenon too frequently over-
looked.  Many for-profit firms that maintain opera-
tions in failed and fragile States discharge significant 
quasi-governmental functions.  They provide security, 
housing, food, water, transportation, infrastructure, 
and healthcare.  And, they undertake such tasks not 
only for their employees but, sometimes, these busi-
nesses also reach beyond their own private domain to 
respond to challenges impacting the local community.  
Yet, legal scholarship on failed and fragile States 
largely ignores the provision of public goods by these 
business entities. 
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This Article suggests that much work remains to be 
done to grapple with the implications of the various 
functions undertaken by these business entities.  The 
Article first details instances of corporations acting as 
semi-States to add fresh nuance to the prevailing nar-
rative concerning the role of business in failed and 
fragile States.  It then marshals theoretical insights 
available at the intersection of corporate law and in-
ternational law to suggest a more complex under-
standing of the behavior of profit-motivated actors in 
the State’s absence. 
The Article then applies this renovated model to ques-
tion the appropriateness of laws that dissuade firms 
from operating in failed and fragile States.  It flags 
and addresses reasons for caution but also considers 
alternative means through which the international 
community might better foster the socially beneficial 
potential of for-profit firms operating in failing States. 
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“[W]hen state functions collapse, citizens are often compelled to look 
elsewhere to fill the sovereignty gap . . .”1 
INTRODUCTION 
When the Ebola virus swept through West Africa in 2014, the 
Liberian government could not cope.2  Overwhelmed by the rapidly 
spreading contagion, mounting fatalities, and widespread social pan-
ic, the country’s already-fragile public health sector neared collapse.3  
The U.N. Security Council declared the outbreak a “threat to interna-
tional peace and security.”4  Yet, the Liberian government seemed 
powerless in the face of this historic pandemic, and the World Health 
Organization’s slow and stilted response in deploying support has 
since been the subject of widespread condemnation.5  Ultimately, 
Ebola claimed over 11,000 lives in the region, and Liberia recorded 
almost 5,000 fatalities, the highest of any country affected.6 
Amidst this immense tragedy, however, there was a surprising 
outlier.  With the onset of Ebola, Firestone quickly sprang into ac-
tion.  The company, an arm of the Japanese tire giant Bridgestone, 
has long run a vast rubber plantation, almost the size of Chicago, an 
hour’s drive from the Liberian capital of Monrovia.7  And, crucially, 
 
 1. Robert B. Zoellick, Fragile States:  Securing Development, 50 SURVIVAL 67, 71 
(2008) (writing as then-President of the World Bank). 
 2. See Joseph D. Forrester et al., Assessment of Ebola Virus Disease, Health Care 
Infrastructure, and Preparedness—Four Counties, Southeastern Liberia, August 2014, 63 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 891, 891–93 (2014). 
 3. See U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7260th mtg. at 2–4, U.N. Doc. S/PV/7260 (Sept. 9, 
2014). 
 4. S.C. Res. 2176, U.N.Doc. S/RES/2176 (Sept. 15, 2014). 
 5. See WORLD HEALTH ORG. [“WHO”], REPORT OF THE EBOLA INTERIM ASSESSMENT 
PANEL 5 (July 2015), http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/report-by-
panel.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/2HML-KNST]; Suerie Moon et al., Will Ebola Change the 
Game?  Ten Essential Reforms Before the Next Pandemic.  The Report of the Harvard-
LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola, 386 LANCET 2204 (2015).  See 
also Matiangai Sirleaf, Ebola Does Not Fall from the Sky:  Global Structural Violence and 
International Responsibility, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 477, 516–26 (2018). 
 6. Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 12, 2018), http://www.who. 
int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/ [https://perma.cc/7R47-6UEJ]; 2014 Ebola Outbreak in 
West Africa—Case Counts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 13, 2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/case-counts.html [https://perma. 
cc/FFE7-G79G]. 
 7. T. Christian Miller & Jonathan Jones, Firestone and the Warlord, PROPUBLICA 
(Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/firestone-and-the-warlord-intro [https:// 
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it operated its own hospital and health clinics within its compound.8  
These company facilities provided health coverage for Firestone’s 
8,500 employees but also served a patient pool of almost 80,000 em-
ployee dependents and Liberians from neighboring areas.9 
Within ten days of its sentinel case, Firestone had established 
an Ebola Treatment Unit in its compound, and the company’s health 
professionals implemented screening, isolation, education, and rein-
tegration practices that have since been widely praised.10  As a result, 
the Firestone District reported no further Ebola cases for several 
months after its initial encounter.11  And, even at the pandemic’s 
height, the incidence rate of Ebola within Firestone District was less 
than half that of surrounding Margibi county.12  Moreover, almost 
40% of the Ebola patients treated at Firestone’s hospital were not 
even employees or their dependents but were instead persons from 
neighboring locales who came seeking treatment.13  Asked later how 
Liberia’s response to the Ebola outbreak might be improved, Dr. 
Brendan Flannery, head of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s medical team in the country, simply replied, “More 
Firestones.”14 
 
perma.cc/TT3Y-9Q6Z]. 
 8. Health Care at Firestone Liberia, FIRESTONE NAT. RUBBER CO., https://www. 
firestonenaturalrubber.com/healthcare/overview/ [https://perma.cc/LCN2-XA7M]. 
 9. Erik J. Reaves et al., Control of Ebola Virus Disease—Firestone District, Liberia, 
2014, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 959, 959–60 (2014). 
 10. See id. at 961; M. Allison Arwady et al., Reintegration of Ebola Survivors into 
Their Communities—Firestone District, Liberia, 2014, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. 
REP. 1207, 1207–08 (2014).  See also Drew Hinshaw, Liberian Rubber Farm Becomes 
Sanctuary Against Ebola, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/liberian-
rubber-farm-becomes-sanctuary-against-ebola-1412629331 [https://perma.cc/7K6K-2QF6]; 
Beating Ebola:  One Company’s Fight in Liberia Shows How to Do It, NBC NEWS (Oct. 22, 
2014), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virus-outbreak/beating-ebola-one-
companys-fight-liberia-shows-how-do-it-n230961 [https://perma.cc/K5YU-KQZB]. 
 11. Reaves et al., supra note 9, at 961–62. 
 12. Id. at 963.  See also WHO, WHO:  EBOLA RESPONSE ROADMAP SITUATION REPORT 
3, at 3 (Sept. 12, 2014), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/133073/1/roadmapsitrep3_ 
eng.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/P78N-BBPH] (observing that “[a]n increase in new cases 
has also been reported in districts throughout the country, including Bong, Bomi, Grand 
Bassa, Margibi and Nimba”); WHO, WHO: EBOLA RESPONSE ROADMAP SITUATION REPORT 
3 (Oct. 1, 2014), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/135600/1/roadmapsitrep_ 
1Oct2014_eng.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/8D6N-GDTV] (noting that “[t]he counties of 
Bong, Grand Bassa, Margibi and Nimba continue to report high numbers of new cases”). 
 13. Reaves et al., supra note 9, at 959–65. 
 14. Jason Beaubien, Firestone Did What Governments Have Not:  Stopped Ebola in Its 
Tracks, NPR (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2014/10/06/ 
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This Article uses Firestone’s Ebola response as a point of en-
try to examine an under-studied but important phenomenon.  Many 
for-profit firms that maintain operations in failed and fragile States 
discharge significant quasi-governmental functions.15  They provide 
security, housing, food, water, transport, infrastructure, and 
healthcare.  And, they undertake such tasks not only for their em-
ployees but, sometimes, also reach beyond their own private domain 
to respond to challenges impacting the local community. 
Yet, legal scholarship on failed and fragile States often passes 
over the constructive potential of these business entities.16  Indeed, 
John Ruggie, the U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative 
for Business and Human Rights and author of the U.N.’s Principles 
on Business and Human Rights, summarized the prevailing percep-
tion of business in failing States by observing that weak, conflict-
affected States “attract illicit and borderline enterprises because . . . 
in practice, they essentially function as ‘law-free’ zones in which 
even outright looting and pillaging are possible without fear of being 
 
354054915/firestone-did-what-governments-have-not-stopped-ebola-in-its-tracks [https:// 
perma.cc/7JQV-RJFL]. 
 15. This Article draws on examples of companies operating in countries that the World 
Bank ranks among the most fragile and difficult for doing business.  These metrics are 
imperfect, as others have argued.  Yet, they are useful tools for focusing the current inquiry 
on States with severe governance challenges.  The “failed” or “fragile” States moniker is not 
without controversy, but it is here used as a shorthand so as to engage the debate upon terms 
deployed by global policymakers.  See WORLD BANK GRP., INFORMATION NOTE:  THE 
WORLD BANK GROUP’S HARMONIZED LIST OF FRAGILE SITUATIONS, http://pubdocs. 
worldbank.org/en/586581437416356109/FCS-List-FY16-Information-Note.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7J5F-JJLM]; WORLD BANK GRP., HARMONIZED LIST OF FRAGILE SITUATIONS FY 
18, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/189701503418416651/FY18FCSLIST-Final-July-
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KLP4-B2EH]; WORLD BANK GRP., DOING BUSINESS 2017 (14th 
ed. 2017), http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annual-
Reports/English/DB17-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JDR2-A9UQ].  Critiquing concepts of 
good governance and failed States, see, e.g., B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to 
International Law:  A Manifesto, 8 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 3, 16 (2006); Ruth Gordon, 
Saving Failed States:  Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
903, 963–71 (1997). 
 16. See, e.g., CHIARA GIORGETTI, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO STATE FAILURE:  
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ACTIONS IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 38–39 (2010) (discussing 
the constructive role of States and international organizations, but examining business for 
just over a page and admitting that “[w]hile the international community stalled, Somalis’ 
entrepreneurship took control”); MARIO SILVA, STATE LEGITIMACY AND FAILURE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 190–93 (2014); GERARD KREIJEN, STATE FAILURE, SOVEREIGNTY AND 
EFFECTIVENESS:  LEGAL LESSONS FROM DECOLONIZATION OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 308 
(2004); Gerald B. Helman & Stephen R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 FOREIGN POL’Y 3, 
12–18 (1992) (advocating a system of UN conservatorship as a possible answer to address 
the problem of failed States). 
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sanctioned.”17  Failed and fragile States are thus regularly described 
as places of immense darkness, whose lack of a functioning govern-
ment facilitates the rise of terrorist groups and criminal gangs.18  
And, it is accordingly assumed that businesses that persist in such 
places are, by implication or association, opportunists that must be 
doing bad things.19 
 
 17. See JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS 29 (2013).  See also John Ruggie 
(Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Business and Human Rights in 
Conflict-Affected Regions:  Challenges and Options Towards State Responses, ¶ 5, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/17/32 (May 27, 2011) (observing that “[u]nsurprisingly, the most egregious 
business related human rights abuses also take place in such environments [conflict 
situations], where the human regime cannot be expected to function as intended.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Mario Silva, Somalia:  State Failure, Piracy, and the Challenge to 
International Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 553, 554 (2010) (“In Somalia the failure of the state to 
provide good governance, security, and respect for the rule of law is at the very heart of the 
country’s endemic conflict.  These inabilities, in turn, have fueled piracy and provided a 
breeding ground for terrorist activity.”); Frédéric Gilles Sourgens, The End of Law:  The 
ISIL Case Study for a Comprehensive Theory of Lawlessness, 39 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 355, 
362 (2015); Brian Finucane, Fictitious States, Effective Control, and the Use of Force 
Against Non-State Actors, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 35, 37–39 (2012); John Yoo, Fixing 
Failed States, 99 CAL. L. REV. 95, 96 (2011) (arguing that “[f]ailed states pose one of the 
deepest challenges to American national security and international peace and stability” 
because “[t]hey serve as an incubator for international terrorist groups” and “[t]heir lack of 
stable government authority allows them to become trans-shipment points of illicit drugs, 
human trafficking, or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”); Robert Gates, U.S. 
Sec’y of Def., Remarks Delivered at the Nixon Center (Feb. 24, 2010), http://archive. 
defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1425 [https://perma.cc/EUW9-BHX8] 
(arguing that “the most likely and lethal threats . . . will likely emanate from fractured or 
failing states” and labeling this “the ideological and security challenge of our time”); NAT’L 
SEC. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (2002), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf [https://perma.cc/5N8L-C6H8] 
(“America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit:  Transnational Corporations and 
Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 48–49 (2002) (examining “the largely 
uncontrolled human rights danger posed by multinationals” and asserting “the harsh reality 
that corporations often profit from abusive behavior”); John Ruggie (Special Representative 
of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises), Business and Human Rights in Conflict-Affected Regions: 
Challenges and Options Towards State Responses, ¶¶ 5–6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/32 (May 
27, 2011), https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC. 
17.32_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2LV-WXUS] (noting, without additional support, that 
“[u]nsurprisingly, the most egregious business-related human rights abuses also take place in 
such environments [conflict situations], where the human regime cannot be expected to 
function as intended” and calling on other States to restrain corporate actors when the “‘host’ 
State may be unable to protect human rights adequately owing to a lack of effective 
control”); Naomi Klein, How Power Profits from Disaster, GUARDIAN (July 6, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jul/06/naomi-klein-how-power-profits-from-
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It is true that firms doing business in failed and fragile States 
are sometimes far from blameless.  Scholars, advocates, and mem-
bers of the local community have well-founded reasons to treat such 
business entities with suspicion.  Some business actors have histori-
cally been and continue to be involved in abusive, coercive, interven-
tionist, and imperialist conduct in such States.20  Moreover, Firestone 
began operations in Liberia in 1926 because of an extended lease 
whose terms have been widely rebuked as exploitative, and Firestone 
has since been accused of a slew of human rights abuses.21 
Yet, if we only castigate such firms and presume that their 
operations absent oversight by the government in whose territory 
they are functioning are likely to be pernicious, we might easily over-
look their ability to respond positively to governance challenges in 
such areas of State fragility. 
Nor, it must be said, have other actors that often receive more 
positive treatment concerning their governance functions in failed 
and fragile States been entirely blameless.  United Nations peace-
keepers introduced cholera to Haiti, causing almost 10,000 deaths, 
and the U.N. subsequently refused to pay compensation, claiming or-
ganizational immunity.22  The global charity Oxfam has also been 
 
disaster [https://perma.cc/6FTS-VA3W]. 
 20. See infra Section II.  See also, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman 
Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (listing serious crimes allegedly 
committed by the Canadian oil company Talisman and observing that “[t]he Amended 
Complaint properly alleges that Talisman aided and abetted or conspired with Sudan to 
commit various violations of the law of nations”); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th 
Cir. 2002); 4 TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF S. AFR. REPORT 18–58 (1998), 
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/Volume%204.pdf [http://perma.cc/W88P-
JJVF]. 
 21. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (2011); Donald Earl 
Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational 
Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 725 n.124 (2012); Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, 
Think Globally, Sue Locally:  Trends and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort 
Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456, 476 (2011); see also Firestone and the Warlord, 
Frontline, PBS (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/firestone-and-the-
warlord/ [https://perma.cc/RR5H-PBR]; T. Christian Miller & Jonathan Jones, Firestone and 
the Warlord, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/firestone-and-
the-warlord-intro [https://perma.cc/4EJU-33SX]. 
 22. Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights), Rep. of 
the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/71/40823 
(2016), https://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/ReportGA71st.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5QQD-YC39]; U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, HAITI 
CHOLERA FIGURES AS OF 27 APRIL 2018 (Apr. 27, 2018), https://reliefweb.int/sites/ 
reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha-hti-cholera-figures-20180427_en_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
5QQD-YC39]; Jonathan M. Katz, U.N. Admits Role in Cholera Epidemic in Haiti, N.Y. 
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accused of a range of violations and was recently expelled from Hai-
ti.23  In addition, non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) and in-
ternational organizations like the U.N., which are tasked with assist-
ing weak States in the performance of essential State functions, rely 
on outside funding to sustain their operations at a time when certain 
States are seeking to reduce their international financial commit-
ments.24 
International policymakers therefore face a significant di-
lemma.  The World Bank estimates that two billion people live in 
States “where development outcomes are affected by fragility, con-
flict, and violence.”25  However, ensuring the delivery of essential 
public services by building the capacity of such weak States has 
proven difficult, both in the sphere of healthcare and with regard to a 
range of other functions that people might ordinarily expect the gov-
ernment to discharge or guarantee.26 
 
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/world/americas/united- 
nations-haiti-cholera.html [https://perma.cc/ZZG2-XK8D]; Rick Gladstone, U.N. Brought 
Cholera to Haiti.  Now It Is Fumbling Its Effort to Atone, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/world/americas/cholera-haiti-united-nations-
peacekeepers-yemen.html [https://perma.cc/D7RS-3KVG]. 
 23. Oxfam GB Banned from Haiti After Sex Scandal, BBC NEWS (June 13, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-44474211 [https://perma.cc/CSE9-KLK8]; Haiti Shuts Down 
Oxfam GB over Prostitution Scandal, GUARDIAN (June 14, 2018), https://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2018/jun/14/haiti-shuts-down-oxfam-gb-over-prostitution-scandal [https://perma. 
cc/TF4T-T5L7]. 
 24. Carol Morello, U.N. Budget Cuts Highlight New U.S. Approach, WASH. POST (Dec. 
26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/un-budget-cuts-
highlight-new-us-approach/2017/12/26/6a313f42-ea69-11e7-9f92-10a2203f6c8d_story. 
html?utm_term=.1eaf9461df8d [https://perma.cc/3SWV-QBBU]. 
 25. See Fragility, Conflict and Violence: Overview, WORLD BANK 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/overview [https://perma.cc/ 
V247-ZHR4].  See also AFRICAN DEV. BANK GRP., AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP 
STRATEGY FOR ADDRESSING FRAGILITY AND BUILDING RESILIENCE IN AFRICA 2014–2019, 
16–17 (2015), https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/ 
Addressing_Fragility_and_Building_Resilience_in_Africa-_The_AfDB_Group_Strategy_ 
2014%E2%80%932019.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKU8-TTUK] (observing that “[r]ecent 
estimates show that more than one-third of African countries, with some 250 million people, 
are affected by various forms of fragility, and even more if one takes into account sub-
national fragility”); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Failed States, or the State as Failure, 72 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1174 (2005) (arguing that “[w]eak, failing and failed states are not the 
exception in many parts of the world.  They are the norm, and have been since their 
inception.”). 
 26. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. [“OECD”], STATES OF FRAGILITY 2018, 
at 21–68, http://www.oecd.org/dac/states-of-fragility-2018-9789264302075-en.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/YF5Z-6KYX]. 
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This Article explores how decisionmakers might better de-
ploy international law to align companies’ profit-incentives with the 
discharge of quasi-State functions in settings of State fragility.  The 
Article asserts that, when faced with second- and third-best choices, 
scholars and policymakers can no longer afford to overlook the full 
developmental capacity of business actors.  It acknowledges and ex-
plores reasons for caution, but also suggests changes to the current 
legal and policy framework that may spur positive innovation. 
To reach this destination, the Article proceeds along the fol-
lowing path.  Part I introduces readers to corporations acting as semi-
States, a term used to describe business entities that not only maintain 
operations in failed or fragile States but also themselves take on and 
discharge important quasi-State functions.  States all over the world 
have privatized various functions once thought to be the province of 
public governance.  But, what is described here is something slightly 
different.  Instead, the section highlights companies that have them-
selves begun to discharge State-like, public functions not necessarily 
because the State has nominated these companies to undertake such 
tasks but because the State has effectively defaulted. 
Part II offers some rationale for the absence of these actors 
from previous scholarly accounts of State fragility, rooting its expla-
nation in the historical estrangement of international law from corpo-
rations and vice versa, as scholars traditionally embraced the State as 
the sole subject of the international legal system.  Undoing that es-
trangement has occupied some scholars for the last few decades, but 
the State remains at the pinnacle of the international legal hierarchy.  
Indeed, even when legal scholars and policymakers confront situa-
tions of State failure, alternative forms of governance are usually ne-
glected, and the prevailing assumption is that the State itself must be 
rebuilt.27 
 
 27. See Brooks, supra note 25, at 1184–85; U.N. SEC’Y-GEN., In Larger Freedom:  
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 
21, 2005), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/wp-content/uploads/CPR%20A%2059% 
202005.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA4W-RPZC] (“If States are fragile, the peoples of the world 
will not enjoy the security, development and justice that are their right.  Therefore, one of 
the great challenges of the new millennium is to ensure that all States are strong enough to 
meet the many challenges they face.”).  See also ZARYAB IQBAL, STATE FAILURE IN THE 
MODERN WORLD 125 (2015) (observing that “instead of limiting our attention to intervention 
efforts by the United Nations and regional institutions, we could turn to how private 
entities—such as multinational corporations—play [or might play] a role in keeping states 
from collapsing” but also admitting that “[i]n the absence of extant large-scale analyses, we 
are not in a position to assert whether the involvement of/with private entities would benefit 
a weak or failing state; we merely point to it as a future direction for further investigation of 
the concept and phenomenon of state failure”). 
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In unearthing the historical entanglement of business with the 
project of international law, however, Part II also grapples with the 
crucial role that for-profit firms have played in colonial and imperial 
projects.  This quasi-imperial function served as the original form of 
companies acting as semi-States, and its legacy in the various places 
discussed lingers as a fundamental reason for suspicion of business 
enterprises seeming to act in place of the State.  This section faces 
that history head-on and acknowledges the emphasis on corporate 
compliance with human rights norms that has come about as a result.  
Yet, it also contends that accountability should not be the sole focus 
of our analysis and that a more nuanced approach may prove fruitful. 
Part III articulates the theoretical underpinnings and implica-
tions of the Article’s account.  It uses the designation of certain firms 
as semi-States as a conceptual tool to marshal theoretical insights 
available at the intersection of corporate law and international law.  It 
seeks to explain and better predict when for-profit firms will volun-
tarily assume more significant governance tasks by conceptualizing 
the reputational gain derived from the discharge of such functions as 
a form of investment or insurance against market uncertainty in the 
absence of traditional governance institutions. 
Part IV deploys these descriptive and theoretical insights to-
ward normative and prescriptive applications.  It uses the analysis in 
Parts I–III to suggest a different approach through which the interna-
tional community may better foster, incentivize, and harness the so-
cially beneficial potential of for-profit firms discharging quasi-
governmental functions in settings of State failure and fragility. 
The Article then concludes by proposing that when States col-
lapse, rather than simply looking to rebuild public governance on the 
same terms, the international community ought also to engage more 
carefully with the possibility and potentiality of for-profit firms act-
ing as semi-States. 
I. THE BUSINESS OF STATE 
When a State collapses due to war, civil strife, or cataclysmic 
disaster, the inclination of many for-profit firms present there is to 
leave or fold.28  The conflagration not only increases physical danger 
 
 28. See, e.g., Lin Noueihed, Exxon to Cut Back Libya Presence As Security Crumbles, 
REUTERS (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/libya-exxonmobil-
idUSL5N0HD1UM20130917 [https://perma.cc/9JV9-ATVD]; Vivienne Walt, Big Oil 
Companies in the Cross Fire as Libyan Violence Erupts, FORTUNE (Mar. 5, 2015), http:// 
fortune.com/2015/03/05/libya-oil-companies-isis-fighting/ [https://perma.cc/R37L-QA7L]; 
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to the businesses’ employees and assets, but maintaining operations 
in failed or failing States can risk reputational, financial, and legal 
harm to the enterprises involved.29  A cloud of suspicion is often 
generated, and this in turn has the potential to increase the already-
significant costs of doing business in such States.30  As such, this risk 
of non-physical harm adds to the incentives for firms to exit at exact-
ly the time when the country whose administration is disintegrating 
would seem to need functioning organizations the most.31 
 
Denis Dumo, South Sudan’s Biggest Bank Shuts Branches As Hyperinflation Bites, REUTERS 
(May 12, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/southsudan-banking/south-sudans-biggest-
bank-shuts-branches-as-hyperinflation-bites-idUSL4N1IA4H4 [https://perma.cc/CJB3-
YN26]; but cf. Klein, supra note 19. 
 29. Corporations must also navigate a complicated thicket of sanctions that may be 
imposed against the collapsing State.  See U.N. GLOB. COMPACT, GUIDANCE ON RESPONSIBLE 
BUSINESS IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH-RISK AREAS:  A RESOURCE FOR COMPANIES AND 
INVESTORS 13 (2010),  https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/Peace_and_ 
Business/Guidance_RB.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XVG-RPTL] (outlining these sanctions and 
observing that “[c]ompanies may become implicated in abuses and allegations of complicity 
in human rights abuses,” so that “[s]uch accusations may be costly both reputationally and 
financially for a company and seriously affect the concerned communities”); OECD, OECD 
DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE SUPPLY CHAINS OF MINERALS FROM CONFLICT-
AFFECTED AND HIGH RISK AREAS 13, 20, 57–58, 89 (2016), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/ 
mne/OECD-Due-Diligence-Guidance-Minerals-Edition3.pdf [https://perma.cc/STB7-SACZ] 
(urging companies to pay heed to U.N. and domestic sanctions as part of their internal due 
diligence process). 
 30. Dianna Games, Doing Business in Post-Conflict and Fragile States:  Challenges 
and Risks 32 (Dev. Bank of S. Afr., Working Paper Series No. 23, 2011), http://www. 
dbsa.org/EN/About-Us/Publications/Documents/DPD%20No23.%20Doing%20business% 
20in%20post-conflict%20and%20fragile%20states-%20Challenges%20and%20risks.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5NQD-XE5F] (observing that “[r]eputational risk is a significant potential 
problem for companies in conflict and even post-conflict areas, given the shadowy forces at 
large”); Easy to Lose:  Reputations are Precious—and Fragile, ECONOMIST (Jan. 22, 2004), 
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2004/01/22/easy-to-lose [http://perma.cc/5UQU-
QK2T] (noting the general perception that “[b]usinesses are now finding that, perhaps 
unfairly, they are being judged by the company they keep”). 
 31. Throughout the Article the terms, “business,” “company,” “corporation,” and 
“enterprise” are used interchangeably and in an inexact way to encapsulate private-sector 
entities driven by the pursuit of profit.  The author is aware of the challenges in this respect, 
but seeks to forgo precision in favor of inclusiveness, so as to capture an area of inquiry 
largely neglected.  The emphasis on transnational corporations is not intended to obscure the 
role of the local private sector, but merely serves to highlight the problematic incentives for 
business not otherwise affiliated with the fragile State to exit.  On the challenges of 
definition with respect to transnational business entities, see PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 5–8 (2d ed. 2007).  It may be that the use of 
these terms interchangeably makes little practical difference.  See Margaret M. Blair & Lyn 
A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249–50 (1999).  
Indeed, the U.N.’s Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
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Yet, some firms decide to stay.  This section examines such 
business entities and frames the discussion according to the various 
quasi-governmental functions that they have been found to discharge. 
A. Infrastructure and Logistics 
In Haiti, the Bermuda-based cell phone company Digicel 
erects street signs on unmarked byways in its trademark bright red 
and white.32  After the 2010 earthquake wrought horrific devastation 
and severely limited government capacity in Haiti, Digicel undertook 
a range of community projects, rebuilding the iconic Marché de Fer 
(Iron Market) and constructing over 170 schools.33  Indeed, for sev-
 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises uses “corporations” and “business” 
interchangeably.  See John Ruggie (Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on 
the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), 
Protect, Respect and Remedy:  A Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008). 
 32. For an example of one of Digicel’s street signs, see Haiti Project: Update 2, 
CARTOON MOVEMENT (July 13, 2011, 9:08 PM), https://blog.cartoonmovement. 
com/2011/07/haiti-project-update-2.html [https://perma.cc/ZM3K-VKGV].  See also Garry 
Pierre-Pierre, The Republic of Digicel, HAITIAN TIMES (July 12, 2014), http://haitiantimes. 
com/the-republic-of-digicel/ [https://perma.cc/RWS3-8PXS] (noting that “[s]treet signs in 
Petion Ville feature the Digicel blood red color”); Stephanie Strom, A Billionaire Lends 
Haiti a Hand, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/ 
business/digicels-denis-obrien-helps-rebuild-haiti.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/T6ET-
K73D] (reporting that “Digicel, for instance, has put up street signs in parts of Port-au-
Prince, serving as reminders of the company’s role in public life as much as guides for 
navigating the city”). 
 33. U.N. Sec. Council, Rep. of the Sec’y-Gen. on the U.N. Stabilization Mission in 
Haiti, ¶¶ 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/2010/200 (2010) (stating that, due to the 2010 earthquake, 
“222,570 people were killed, many thousands were injured or permanently disabled and 1.5 
million were left homeless”; and “[t]he capacity of the Haitian State was seriously affected,” 
such that “up to one third of the country’s 60,000 civil servants perished” and “[m]any 
government buildings were destroyed or badly damaged”); David Adams, Irish Cellphone 
Entrepreneur Banks on a Smarter Haiti, REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-haiti-digicel-obrien/irish-cellphone-entrepreneur-banks-on-a-smarter-haiti-
idUSBRE90F0AQ20130116 [https://perma.cc/J5QN-7ENP]; Réalisations à date, DIGICEL 
FOUND. HAITI, http://www.digicelfoundation.org/haiti/fr/accueil/a-propos-de-nous/message-
du-fondateur/enonce-de-notre-mission.html [https://perma.cc/CBY5-KES5] (“173 écoles ont 
été construites à travers le pays desservent plus de 60,000 étudiants.”); 170 écoles 
construites par la Fondation Digicel à cette date, LE NOUVELLISTE (Jan. 26, 2017), 
http://www.lenouvelliste.com/article/167786/170-ecoles-construites-par-la-fondation-
digicel-a-cette-date [https://perma.cc/YZM7-JHMJ]; La Fondation Digicel va inaugurer sa 
171e école, LE NOUVELLISTE (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.lenouvelliste.com/ 
article/167862/la-fondation-digicel-va-inaugurer-sa-171e-ecole [https://perma.cc/2Z4U-
2GAG]; Digicel Grp. Ltd., Amendment No. 3 to Registration Statement (Form F-1) at 11 
                                                               
2019] CORPORATIONS AS SEMI-STATES 233 
eral years after the earthquake, the company hosted the offices of the 
mayor of Port-au-Prince, with citizens seeking State action from the 
mayor lined up in front of Digicel’s office block.34  In addition to 
their social impact, these initiatives raised Digicel’s brand profile, 
helping it to achieve a 70% market share by 2015.35  Yet, these pro-
jects would seem, at least at first blush, to extend well beyond 
Digicel’s primary business. 
Digicel is not alone.  Mobile phone companies often initiate 
and supervise extensive infrastructure upgrades in the States in which 
they operate.36  These challenges are particularly significant in places 
impacted by weak State governance or conflict and require a signifi-
cant degree of engagement with the local community. 
In Afghanistan, for example, the mobile phone company 
Roshan sought to procure local buy-in for protecting company assets 
by paying tribes a bonus if the company’s booster stations remained 
functional for a year.37  The company has also long run a low-cost 
health clinic, dug wells that have provided water for over 100,000 
people, and distributed 40,000 meals a month for internally displaced 
people, especially children.38  Despite these significant outlays, in its 
 
(Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1645826/000119312515324843/ 
d946689df1a.htm [https://perma.cc/D983-6WHC] (“The Digicel Foundations focus 
particularly on youth-oriented programs and projects that encourage self-sufficiency in the 
local community.  To this end the Digicel Foundation in Haiti has built 150 schools across 
the country.”). 
 34. See Strom, supra note 32 (noting that “[m]ost mornings, people crowd around the 
reception desk of Digicel’s office building, not to complain about the firm’s services but to 
see the mayor and other city officials whose offices are on the sixth floor since the 
earthquake”). 
 35. Digicel Grp. Ltd., supra note 33, at 6 (noting Digicel’s favorable market share in 
Haiti and observing that in Haiti “Digicel is one of the most recognized consumer brands, 
with a top of mind rating of over 80% compared to 15% for its main competitor”). 
 36. John Bray, International Companies and Post-Conflict Reconstruction:  Cross-
Sectoral Comparisons 12–22 (World Bank Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction, Paper No. 
22, 2005), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/994031468752728929/pdf/31819. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/4YYR-HZEE]. 
 37. See Mary Porter Peschka, The Role of the Private Sector in Fragile and Conflict-
Affected States, WORLD BANK DEV. REP. 2011 (Apr. 2011), at 55–57, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/887641468163482532/pdf/620590WP0The0R0
BOX0361475B00PUBLIC0.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4JP-NVQ3]. 
 38. See Our Projects:  Health and Nutrition, ROSHAN, https://www.roshan.af/en/ 
personal/community/our-projects/ [https://perma.cc/HG5Q-WXMQ].  See also Sameer A. 
Azizi, Strategic CSR in Afghanistan:  The Case of Roshan, An Afghan Telecommunication 
Company 18–31 (Copenhagen Bus. Sch. Ctr. for Bus. & Dev. Studies, Working Paper No. 1, 
2012), http://openarchive.cbs.dk/bitstream/handle/10398/8444/Azizi_CBDS_nr%20_1_ 
2012.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/3ZCR-QZTU]. 
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first four years in operation the company grew the number of phone 
connections in the country from 20,000 land lines to a mobile sub-
scriber base of over 3.5 million customers.39  In addition, Roshan 
partnered with Vodafone to create M-PAISA, a mobile banking ser-
vice that enabled its customers to freely transfer money, and has al-
lowed 1.6 million customers thus far to access financial institutions 
without the need for a physical bank.40  Thus, although Roshan in-
vested in some initially unprofitable and high-risk areas of the coun-
try, it did so with the understanding that “providing telecommunica-
tions has been a catalyst in building civil society.”41 
Similarly, the relatively well-functioning nature of the tele-
communications sector in Somalia has been a persistent paradox for 
commentators and development analysts.42  Somalia has long been 
considered the world’s prototypical failed State, and yet various mo-
bile phone companies have thrived, developing cell tower infrastruc-
ture that promotes connectivity and financial transactions through 
mobile banking.  Indeed, 35% of adults in Somalia utilize mobile 
banking services, a percentage that ties much better functioning 
States in the region, like Tanzania and Uganda.43  And, it has been 
suggested that the functionality of commercial operations relative to 
the State may provide the kernel for a model of State-building in the 
country more broadly.44  Mo Ibrahim, founder of the trans-African 
 
 39. See Peschka, supra note 37, at 55. 
 40. See id. at 56; INT’L FIN. CORP., INCLUSIVE BUSINESS CASE STUDY:  ROSHAN (2014), 
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/2e30f3004439990d969ed62a3fbe5e0b/Roshan.pdf?M
OD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/6YUM-KQQL]. 
 41. Karim Khoja, Connecting a Nation:  Roshan Brings Communications Services to 
Afghanistan, 4 INNOVATIONS 33, 38 (2009), https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/ 
10.1162/itgg.2009.4.1.33 [https://perma.cc/93V9-YTX7].  See also Shining a Light, 
ECONOMIST (Mar. 8, 2007), http://www.economist.com/node/8810997 [https://perma.cc/ 
M2PN-N388]; WORLD ECON. FORUM, RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT IN FRAGILE CONTEXTS 11 
(2016), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC16_Responsible_Investment_Fragile_Context. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/2FLB-HS9K].  
 42. Agnieszka Konkel & Richard Heeks, Challenging Conventional Views on Mobile-
Telecommunications Investment:  Evidence from Conflict Zones, 19 DEV. PRAC. 414, 417 
(2009); Joseph Winter, Telecoms Thriving in Lawless Somalia, BBC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2004), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4020259.stm [https://perma.cc/9EK8-T66K]; Abdi Sheikh 
& Ibrahim Mohamed, Somali Mobile Phone Firms Thrive Despite Chaos, REUTERS (Nov. 3, 
2009), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-somalia-telecoms/somali-mobile-phone-firms-thrive-
despite-chaos-idUKTRE5A21OY20091103 [https://perma.cc/ZP8A-X9TS]. 
 43. U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2016:  HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
FOR EVERYONE 107 (2016), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_ 
development_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW3S-FR6L]. 
 44. See Bray, supra note 36, at 19–20. 
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mobile phone company Celtel has explained his company’s commit-
ment to doing business in various troubled settings by arguing that 
“[w]here you have good telecommunications you usually have de-
mocracy.”45 
Infrastructure and logistics concerns are also pressing for 
companies in the agricultural and extractive sphere.  Such businesses 
possess some commodity that they need to transport away from their 
production site, but transportation gaps and security issues pose sig-
nificant problems.46  These companies may not be oriented implicitly 
to the conscientious extension of the capacity of the State, but their 
business activities may align with such an objective. 
Indeed, some companies specialize in overcoming the logisti-
cal challenges of working in fragile States and, in so doing, facilitate 
not only commerce but also the continued functionality of the State 
itself.  Thus, for example, Bolloré Africa Logistics, a division of a 
large French logistics firm, invested substantially in the port infra-
structure of Abidjan despite an ongoing civil war in Côte d’Ivoire.  
The company was thereby able to reduce the processing time for con-
tainers on the docks dramatically, and the African Development Bank 
(“AfDB”) later argued that, by ensuring that cocoa exports continued 
to be shipped out, Bolloré had “helped keep the country from collaps-
ing.”47  Indeed, the AfDB’s High Level Panel on Fragile States sub-
sequently praised Bolloré’s efforts as illustrative of the company’s 
“‘Afro-optimism’ and its policy of never withdrawing from countries 
in crisis.”48  Yet, despite the conflict, the company became “[t]he 
largest transporter and freight agent of Ivorian cocoa, transporting 
nearly 55% of the market . . .”49 
 
 45. Peschka, supra note 37, at 54.  See also Mo Ibrahim, Celtel’s Founder on Building 
a Business on the World’s Poorest Continent, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2012), https://hbr.org/ 
2012/10/celtels-founder-on-building-a-business-on-the-worlds-poorest-continent [https:// 
perma.cc/XD63-LNMV]. 
 46. AFRICAN UNION, AFRICAN MINING VISION:  FEBRUARY 2009, at 23 (2009), http:// 
www.africaminingvision.org/amv_resources/AMV/Africa_Mining_Vision_English.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FWF4-NTT8] (observing significant infrastructure challenges in many 
States seeking to benefit from extractive industries activities). 
 47. AFRICAN DEV. BANK GRP., ENDING CONFLICT & BUILDING PEACE IN AFRICA:  A 
CALL TO ACTION 19 (2014), https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/ 
Project-and-Operations/Ending_Conflict_and_Building_Peace_in_Africa-_A_Call_to_ 
Action.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP38-CZFE]. 
 48. Id. 
 49. GLOBAL WITNESS, HOT CHOCOLATE:  HOW COCOA FUELED THE CONFLICT IN CÔTE 
D’IVOIRE 18 (2007), https://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/cotedivoire.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SZ86-MNTM]. 
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However, other businesses prefer to address their own logisti-
cal concerns, building roads and airstrips to facilitate transport of 
both commodities and workers.  For example, the Chinese National 
Petroleum Company has invested heavily in improving infrastructure 
in South Sudan.50  A series of studies demonstrates that improved 
roads tend to lead to better development outcomes, particularly in 
terms of increasing access to healthcare and education.51  Yet, the 
benefit of improved transportation can also accrue in favor of nefari-
ous actors.  Indeed, it has been alleged that these improved transport 
networks in Sudan allowed government troops to range more freely 
in the campaign to perpetrate abuses against civilians during the 
country’s civil war.52 
The relationship between business and the State in contexts of 
upheaval is certainly complex, but the preceding examples should 
begin to complicate the reflexive assumption that the performance of 
quasi-governmental functions by business actors will always accrue 
to the detriment of the State and its populace. 
The next subsection points toward the illusory nature of the 
failed States’ claim to a monopoly over the use of force.  Rather than 
relying on the State, business actors in failed and fragile States often 
act instead to guarantee their own security.  But, unlike the State, 
such companies ensure their own safety both through overt force and 
by negotiating arrangements with other rival groups present in the 
territory. 
 
 50. Wojtek Mackiewicz Wolfe & Annette S. Leung Evans, China’s Energy Investment 
and the Corporate Social Responsibility Imperative, 6 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 83, 86 
(2011); GEORGE G. EBERLING, CHINA’S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH ITS PRINCIPAL OIL 
SUPPLIERS 211 (2017). 
 51. Claudia N. Berg et al., Transport Policies and Development 18 (World Bank Grp., 
Pol’y Research Working Paper No. 7366, 2015), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 
893851468188672137/pdf/WPS7366.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GK8-JS5M]; Atushi Iimi et al., 
Evaluating the Social and Economic Impacts of Rural Road Improvements in the State of 
Tocantins, Brazil 7 (World Bank Grp., Working Paper No. 95574, 2015), http://documents. 
worldbank.org/curated/en/109021467992478157/pdf/95574-WP-P121495-Box391433B-
PUBLIC-Evaluating-the-Social-and-Economic-Impacts-of-Rural-Road-Improvements-in-
the-State-of-Tocantins-Brazil.pdf [https://perma.cc/XA9L-NKFV]; Shahidur Khandker et 
al., The Poverty Impact of Rural Roads:  Evidence from Bangladesh, 57 ECON. DEV. & 
CULTURAL CHANGE 685, 696 (2009). 
 52. See Alexander Dziadosz, Special Report: South Sudan’s Chinese Oil Puzzle, 
REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-chinese-oil/ 
special-report-south-sudans-chinese-oil-puzzle-idUSBRE8AD0B520121114 [https://perma. 
cc/6AYK-RL6T]; CHRISTIAN AID, THE SCORCHED EARTH:  OIL AND WAR IN SUDAN 6 (2001), 
http://www.ecosonline.org/reports/2001/Thescorchedearth.pdf [https://perma.cc/DL56-
VZBY]. 
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B. Security 
When confronting situations of State fragility, corporations 
face a series of choices in terms of how they order their business op-
erations.  Sometimes the company finds itself in the midst of upheav-
al, having made its initial investment under conditions of peace and 
stability that have subsequently deteriorated.  The business must then 
decide whether to stay or leave.  Indeed, when internal revolution and 
foreign-backed regime change swept through Libya in 2011, the Ital-
ian energy company Eni had to make exactly this sort of choice.  Eni 
had been present in Libya since 1959 and, despite the challenges that 
the upheaval represented and subsequent security setbacks, the com-
pany has maintained its Libyan operations through an increased secu-
rity presence to ensure the safety of its equipment and employees.53 
In other cases, companies will enter difficult settings because 
they have calculated that the risk present is tolerable given the poten-
tial profit.  Thus, for example, APR Energy not only entered enthusi-
astically into the Libyan market after the overthrow of Colonel Gad-
dafi, but also decided to expand its intended power output 
significantly in 2013.54  Eventually the company was forced to aban-
 
 53. See Eni SpA, Annual Report (S.E.C. Form 20-F) 16 (Mar. 22, 2017),  
https://www.eni.com/docs/en_IT/enicom/publications-archive/publications/reports/reports-
2016/Annual-Report-On-Form-20-F-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJK3-MKK9] (“In 2011, 
Eni’s operations in Libya were materially affected by an internal revolution and a change of 
regime, which has led to a prolonged period of political and social instability characterized 
by acts of local conflict, social unrest, protests, strikes and other similar events.  Those 
political developments forced Eni to temporarily interrupt or reduce its producing activities, 
negatively affecting Eni’s results of operations and cash flow until the situation began to 
stabilize.  Although the Group’s production levels in Libya have returned to levels prior to 
the outbreak of the civil war, the geopolitical situation remains unstable and unpredictable.  
In 2016, Eni’s production in Libya was 346 kboe/day, the highest level since the outbreak of 
the civil war, which represented approximately 20% of the Group’s total production for the 
year.”). 
 54. See APR ENERGY, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 35, http://quote.morningstar.com/ 
stock-filing/Annual-Report/2012/12/31/t.aspx?t=:APRYY&ft=&d= 
16bfe41a2f23e82e278d2854c217010e [https://perma.cc/MRT4-ABGL] (“We exited 2012 
strongly. . . .  This momentum has continued into 2013, with the signing of three new 
contracts in Libya, Guatemala, and Indonesia. . . . The Libya win represents the largest 
single contract in APR Energy history.”); Esha Vaish, APR Energy Quits Libya as 
Government Fails to Ratify Contract, REUTERS (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/apr-energy-libya-idUSL6N0V51RK20150126 [https://perma.cc/QX9D-6CW5] 
(noting that “Libya accounted for about a quarter of the company’s total sales of $308 
million in 2013 and was instrumental in the company turning a profit that year.  In June 
2013, the size of the contract was increased to 450 megawatts from 250 megawatts” and that 
“Jacksonville, Florida-based APR’s focus on emerging markets has left it exposed to 
political risk in countries such as Libya, where rival governments vie for control of vast 
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don these plans and leave Libya, citing the deteriorating security sit-
uation and the impossibility of conducting audits on operations 
there.55 
If the business decides to stay, it must then ensure that its em-
ployees are safe and provide for their basic needs.  Companies often 
contract with security firms (either based locally or from elsewhere) 
to guard their staff, compound, offices, and installations.56  An indus-
try has grown up around the provision of basic security for business-
es operating in fragile situations where the State is unable to ensure 
safety.57 
It is unfortunate, but perhaps not surprising, that here one 
finds some of the most significant human rights concerns expressed 
with respect to corporations operating in fragile States.  Yet, these 
concerns are often encountered and arguably inherent when violence 
is used to enforce some notion of order.  Indeed, when the State de-
ploys violence to ensure its hegemony and compel submission, the 
potential for human rights abuses increases even in the most devel-
oped countries.58  However, the attention on corporations deploying 
 
energy fields more than three years after veteran leader Muammar Gaddafi was 
overthrown.”). 
 55. See APR ENERGY, ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at 9–10, 
http://quote.morningstar.com/stock-filing/Annual-Report/2014/12/31/t.aspx?t=:APRYY&ft= 
&d=880e5c3aa8b54bf563c59cef76c6d936 [https://perma.cc/EMX3-YDZ3] (“Towards the 
end of 2014, we made the difficult decision to suspend operations in Libya, followed by our 
announcement in January of this year to exit the country.  The withdrawal has had a 
significant, detrimental effect on the underlying profitability of our business. . . . Adding to 
this complexity, the security situation in Libya, as well as in Yemen, has prevented our 
auditors from physically verifying assets in these jurisdictions.”  The Report also observes 
that “[a]t the time we entered Libya, it was a historic contract to win and a testament to our 
ability to deploy rapidly large blocks of power in an incredibly challenging operational 
environment. . . . From the time we won the contract, we began producing power in just 90 
days.  Also, it was an attractive contract that produced significant revenues, margin and cash 
flow for us, coupled with a customer who greatly valued the power we produced.”). 
 56. See HANNAH TONKIN, STATE CONTROL OVER PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY 
COMPANIES IN ARMED CONFLICT 30–31 (2011); Kevin O’Brien, What Should and What 
Should Not Be Regulated?, in FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET:  THE RISE AND REGULATION 
OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 29, 37–41 (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 
2007). 
 57. See Ernest Harsch, Building a State for the Congolese People, AFR. RENEWAL (Jan. 
2008), http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/january-2008/building-state-congolese-
people [https://perma.cc/4L9S-GH43] (noting that “private security outfits are common in 
the main cities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], hired mostly by foreign and 
local businesses to protect their property and keep crime at bay” because “regular police 
forces . . . are not yet able to guarantee public safety”). 
 58. See generally PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD:  POLICING BLACK MEN (2017). 
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such violence seems to focus not only on the acts but also on the lack 
of legitimacy for such undertakings.  Yet, one might easily question 
the legitimacy of a range of State uses of violence and, as such, these 
concerns are not necessarily unique to corporations.59 
Alternatively, or in parallel with hiring their own security 
contractors, companies sometimes simply pay whichever group con-
trols the territory in which they operate (whether government or in-
surgent fighters) to buy protection for their employees and physical 
assets.  Such payments often draw international ire and may render 
the corporation complicit in a range of abuses.  For example, facing 
an ever-changing security landscape in Syria, the world’s largest ce-
ment manufacturer, LaFarge, made financial payments to several dif-
ferent groups (including sanctioned entities) to protect the staff and 
assets at its concrete plant in the country.60  The company subse-
quently apologized but noted that its local managers did what they 
could to ensure continuity and safety.61 
Companies have also played an active role in ensuring com-
pliance with international law by other actors in fragile States.  In 
Myanmar, for example, the large transnational energy company Total 
E&P “took steps to make its Myanmar stakeholders more aware of 
the rules governing security and human rights in the regions where it 
is operating” and effectively “leveraged its relationship with the 
 
 59. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 722 (2d 
ed. 2006) (noting that “[a] further problem lies in the assumption that ‘State failure’ arises 
from weakness and anarchy rather than overweening strength” since “[t]he evils of the last 
century were overwhelmingly due to strong regimes, and to their aftermath when eventually 
they collapsed.”). 
 60. See Media Release, LafargeHolcim, LafargeHolcim Responds to Syria Review 
(Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.lafargeholcim.com/LafargeHolcim-responds-syria-review 
[https://perma.cc/24LH-R2L8]; Media Release, LafargeHolcim, LafargeHolcim Concludes 
Independent Investigation into Legacy Syria Operations and Issues Summary of 
Investigation Findings (Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.lafargeholcim.com/summary-syria-
investigation-findings [https://perma.cc/9L5Y-6YDM]. 
 61. See Liz Alderman, Lafarge Scandal Points to Difficulty for Businesses in War 
Zones, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/24/business/lafarge-
ceo-syria-cement.html [https://perma.cc/YM5K-V8ML]; Dorothée Myriam Kellou, Le jeu 
dangereux de LaFarge en Syrie, LE MONDE (Nov. 12, 2016), http://www.lemonde.fr/ 
international/article/2016/11/12/le-jeu-dangereux-de-lafarge-en-syrie_5030048_3210.html 
[https://perma.cc/PL5K-EHM6] (“Je pensais au début qu’il était tout à fait acceptable 
d’avoir des relations avec l’EIIL et d’autres groupes islamistes radicaux, car il nous fallait 
être en relation avec les groupes en situation de pouvoir.”).  See also Dorothée Myriam 
Kellou et al., Syrie:  les troubles arrangements de Lafarge avec l’Etat islamique, LE MONDE 
(June 21, 2016), http://www.lemonde.fr/syrie/article/2016/06/21/syrie-les-troubles-
arrangements-de-lafarge-avec-l-etat-islamique_4955023_1618247.html [https://perma.cc/ 
E5N4-GWRN]. 
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Government” to convince the State to join the international Extrac-
tive Industry Transparency Initiative.62  Moreover, the company un-
dertook “human rights training of its employees with the Danish In-
stitute of Human Rights and the ILO [International Labour 
Organization] on good labour practices, with a focus on forced la-
bour, to raise awareness of the population on their rights.”63 
Furthermore, because conflict is often tied either to economic 
deprivation or to disputes over the distribution of economic re-
sources, the private sector plays an important role in reintegrating ex-
soldiers by providing an alternative livelihood to conflict.64  And, 
business actors have played a crucial role in negotiating an end to the 
civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala and to a resolution to the 
ongoing State dysfunction in Somalia.65 
C. Other Quasi-Governmental Tasks 
Ensuring security in times of upheaval is a particularly diffi-
cult objective for those companies that stay, but the discussion of the 
State-like functions of corporations ought not to stop there.  Some 
companies do much more for their employees. 
These enterprises also ensure housing, food, water, and access 
to healthcare for employees stationed in the compounds that the 
company maintains on their behalf, constructing an immediate world 
for their employees that is intended to be safe and relatively hospita-
ble. 
Thus, when the Florida-based electricity company APR Ener-
gy set out to construct and run electricity generation plants in remote 
areas of Libya after the fall of Colonel Gaddafi’s regime, it also es-
tablished “man camps with living, eating, sleeping, bathing, and 
laundry facilities to house workers.”66  Moreover, in its quest to ex-
ploit oil deposits in South Sudan, the China National Petroleum Cor-
poration has built and provisioned similar compounds for its employ-
 
 62. WORLD ECON. FORUM, supra note 41, at 20.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Allan Gerson, Peace Building:  The Private Sector’s Role, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 102, 
105–07 (2001). 
 65. CANAN GUNDUZ, INT’L ALERT, LOCAL BUSINESS, LOCAL PEACE: THE 
PEACEBUILDING POTENTIAL OF THE DOMESTIC PRIVATE SECTOR 324–63, 469–503 (Jessica 
Banfield & Nick Killick eds., 2006), http://www.international-alert.org/publications/local-
business-local-peace [https://perma.cc/7MME-59ZL]. 
 66. TECH. REV. MID. EAST, ANNUAL POWER REVIEW 2014, at 26, https://issuu.com/ 
alaincharles/docs/trme_power_2014_final [https://perma.cc/Q7YL-7LU7]. 
                                                               
2019] CORPORATIONS AS SEMI-STATES 241 
ees stationed in the country.67  Indeed, many companies that do busi-
ness in extractive industries are compelled to operate such camps for 
their employees because the deposits they seek are sometimes situat-
ed in fragile States and the exploration and infrastructure investments 
necessary to initiate such operations are deemed too valuable to 
abandon.68 
Moreover, in order to ensure that a particular locality prospers 
commercially, some companies will take on other governmental 
functions viewed as essential.  Thus, for example, in the eastern part 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo, various business groups have 
joined together to build new roads and ensure their maintenance 
through the collection of local taxes.69 
Other businesses have exploited the absence of the State as 
the central part of their profit model.  Thus, in Syria, DHL delivers 
parcels to areas of the conflict-wracked country where the official 
mail system cannot, exploiting opportunities for profit and providing 
a public service beyond the State’s current capacity.70  Similarly, in 
 
 67. See China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (July 
10, 2017), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/288-china-s-foreign-
policy-experiment-south-sudan [https://perma.cc/P92D-PNJT]; China’s New Courtship in 
South Sudan, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Apr. 4, 2012), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-
africa/south-sudan/china-s-new-courtship-south-sudan [https://perma.cc/RTU9-P643].  See 
generally LUKE PATEY, THE NEW KINGS OF CRUDE:  CHINA, INDIA, AND THE GLOBAL 
STRUGGLE FOR OIL IN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN (2014); LAURA M. JAMES, SMALL ARMS 
SURVEY, FIELDS OF CONTROL:  OIL AND (IN)SECURITY IN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN 19–24 
(2015), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-
WP40-Oil.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5BP-9N6P]; JILL SHANKLEMAN, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, OIL 
AND STATE BUILDING IN SOUTH SUDAN (2011), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/ 
files/Oil_and_State_Building_South_Sudan.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP9Q-NVCY]. 
 68. See PETER D. CAMERON & MICHAEL C. STANLEY, WORLD BANK GROUP, OIL, GAS, 
AND MINING:  A SOURCEBOOK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 242 
(2017), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/222451496911224999/pdf/115792-PUB-
PUBLIC-PUBDATE-6-6-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/SEE2-9BRL] (noting that “extractives 
operations have all too often acquired an ‘enclave’ character.”).  
 69. E-mail from Nathan Smith, Anti-Corruption Project Manager, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Dem. Rep. Congo (Aug. 24, 2017) (on file with author). 
 70. See DHL Express Import Guidelines:  Syria, DHL, http://www.dhl.com.sy/ 
en/country_profile/import_guidelines_express.html [https://perma.cc/73ML-WT5K]; What’s 
the Story, Ms. Halaby?:  Business as Unusual, DELIVERED:  THE GLOBAL LOGISTICS MAG., 
Nov. 2016, http://www.delivered.dhl.com/en/articles/2016/11/whats-the-story-ms-halaby. 
html [https://perma.cc/REZ9-GS46]; Alice Fordham, Syrian President Issues New Stamps, 
But Can’t Deliver the Mail, NPR (July 24, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/ 
parallels/2014/07/24/332249724/syrian-president-issues-new-stamps-but-cant-deliver-the-
mail [https://perma.cc/9GUR-5BZ2].  For advisories from the U.S. and U.K. mail services 
advising on the lack of mail delivery in Syria, see USPS Service Alerts, U.S. POSTAL SERV., 
https://about.usps.com/news/service-alerts/welcome.htm [https://perma.cc/6FXC-824M]; 
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Yemen, both FedEx and Western Union ensure the delivery of mail 
and the transfer of money through a local logistics firm, Griffin.71  
And Aggreko, one of the largest sellers of power generators, main-
tains retail operations in settings of upheaval, including Somalia, 
Yemen, and Libya, so as to allow other businesses to continue oper-
ating in areas lacking stable electrical supplies.72 
Further, some firms assist States grappling with the conse-
quences of regional instability, in a way helping to prevent these 
neighboring States from themselves collapsing.  The Syrian Civil 
War, for example, has forced over 5.6 million people to flee to other 
countries in the region, principally Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, 
and Egypt.73  These States have in turn voiced their concerns loudly 
as to the financial and systemic challenges of absorbing so many ref-
ugees and the politically destabilizing potential of such influxes.74 
In response, the Swedish-founded, Dutch-headquartered fur-
 
Personal Customers Help Centre, ROYAL MAIL, https://personal.help.royalmail.com/app/ 
answers/detail/a_id/5317/~/international-incidents-update [https://perma.cc/8E85-8ES4]. 
 71. See FedEx Services in Yemen, GRIFFIN, http://www.griffin-ltd.com/griffin_fedex_ 
yemen.html [https://perma.cc/254E-SK9H]; Falcon Exchange Co. A Griffin Ltd. Company, 
FALCON EXCH., http://www.falcon-ex.com/about.html [https://perma.cc/95BF-4AH4]. 
 72. See Mark Leftly, Aggreko Counts the Cost of Turmoil in Libya and Yemen, 
EVENING STANDARD (May 14, 2015), https://www.standard.co.uk/business/business-
news/aggreko-counts-the-cost-of-turmoil-in-libya-and-yemen-10250479.html 
[https://perma.cc/YCH6-UALV] (observing that “[s]ecurity threats in Libya and Yemen 
have hit trading at Aggreko, the company that hires out power generators and temperature-
control equipment around the world has said”). 
 73. Operational Portal Refugee Situations:  Syrian Regional Response, U.N. HIGH 
COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (June 24, 2018), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria 
[https://perma.cc/3RST-TYET]. 
 74. Mulqi:  Jordan’s Capacities Maxed Out on Syrian Refugee Crisis, ALGHAD (Apr. 
5, 2017), http://www.alghad.com/articles/1535872-Mulqi-Jordan%E2%80%99s-Capacities-
Maxed-Out-on-Syrian-Refugee-Crisis [https://perma.cc/M5HD-HKER]; Refugee Burden 
Has Exhausted Jordan—Judeh, JORDAN TIMES (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www. 
jordantimes.com/news/local/refugee-burden-has-exhausted-jordan-%E2%80%94-judeh 
[https://perma.cc/PP4W-2KJB]; Stephen Brown, Syria’s Neighbours Risk ‘Host-Country 
Fatigue,’ Conference Hears, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2014), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-
mideast-crisis-refugees/syrias-neighbours-risk-host-country-fatigue-conference-hears-
idUKKBN0IH0WB20141028 [https://perma.cc/77XG-GV2R]; Missy Ryan, Syria Refugee 
Crisis Poses Major Threat to Lebanese Stability: U.N., REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2014), https:// 
www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-usa/syria-refugee-crisis-poses-major-threat-to-lebanese-
stability-u-n-idUSBREA2R02E20140328 [https://perma.cc/3UJ9-EDL9]  (quoting Ninette 
Kelley, regional representative for Lebanon for the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, as stating that “[i]f this country is not bolstered, then the very 
real prospect of it collapsing and the conflict of Syria spreading full force to Lebanon 
becomes much more likely”). 
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niture company Ikea mobilized through its own foundation to assist 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) to 
support these displaced persons.75  To be sure, Ikea has not always 
been a model of enlightened corporate conduct.76  Yet, the company 
clearly recognized in the refugee crisis an opportunity for construc-
tive intervention.  Indeed, while also putting the company’s own 
branding on their efforts and continually emphasizing its mission to 
improve interior design the world over, Ikea has become UNHCR’s 
largest private sector partner.77  The company has provided over 
10,000 new, more durable shelter units for refugee families in the re-
gion, and these so-called “flat pack” shelters include innovations like 
a front door that locks and solar power to fuel the families’ electron-
ics.78  The shelters won the London Design Museum’s Beazley De-
sign of the Year award, but had to be redesigned subsequently due to 
concerns over fire safety.79 
In spite of this significant challenge, Ikea has been at the fore-
 
 75. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR CORPORATE PARTNERSHIPS 
PROGRAMME:  IKEA FOUNDATION, http://www.unhcr.org/partners/partners/54cb9e8f9/unhcr-
ikea-foundation-partnership-fact-sheet.html [https://perma.cc/GW7Y-VADJ].  
 76. Nicholas Kulish & Julia Werdigier, Ikea Admits Forced Labor Was Used in 1980s, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/17/business/global/ikea-to-
report-on-allegations-of-using-forced-labor-during-cold-war.html [https://perma.cc/7RG4-
WYEM] (observing that Ikea had “admitted that political prisoners in the former East 
Germany provided some of the labor that helped it keep its prices so low”). 
 77. Ikea Foundation, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, http://www.unhcr.org/ikea-
foundation.html [https://perma.cc/JSC8-GJXU].  
 78. See Dan Howarth, IKEA’s Flat-Pack Refugee Shelters Go into Production, DEZEEN 
(Mar. 24, 2015), https://www.dezeen.com/2015/03/24/ikea-flat-pack-refugee-shelters-go-
into-production-better-shelter-unhcr/ [https://perma.cc/UX6T-7LFV].  Cf. Elizabeth Cullen 
Dunn, Better Than a Tent, Worse Than a House:  Ikea’s Flat-Pack Shelters for Refugees 
May Make Life More Comfortable.  But They Won’t Solve Any Problems, SLATE (Oct. 1, 
2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/10/ikea_gives_10_000_ 
flat_pack_shelters_for_refugees.html [https://perma.cc/K4FD-RKZH]. 
 79. Oliver Wainwright, Why Ikea’s Flatpack Refugee Shelter Won Design of the Year, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2017/jan/27/why-
ikea-flatpack-refugee-shelter-won-design-of-the-year [https://perma.cc/XL67-4UJJ]; Maya 
Rhodan, Ikea Refugee Shelter Wins Design of the Year Award, FORTUNE (Jan. 30, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/01/30/ikea-refugee-shelter-beazley/ [https://perma.cc/6WDF-
UDDA]; Marcus Fairs, Ikea Refugee Shelter to be Redesigned Following Safety Fears and 
Design Flaws, DEZEEN (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.dezeen.com/2017/04/27/ikea-unhcr-
refugee-better-shelter-redesign-safety-fears-flaws/ [https://perma.cc/P225-2C6E]; Marcus 
Fairs, Ten Thousand IKEA Refugee Shelters Left Unused Over Fire Fears, United Nations 
Admits, DEZEEN (Apr. 29, 2017), https://www.dezeen.com/2017/04/29/united-nations-
admits-10000-ikea-better-shelter-refugees-mothballed-fire-fears/ [https://perma.cc/XGV2-
KC5N]. 
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front of increasing awareness in the developed world concerning ref-
ugee issues, raising over thirty million euros for UNHCR through a 
campaign to donate one euro for each LED light sold in its stores, 
building the first renewable energy-powered refugee camp in Jordan 
and utilizing Syrian refugee workers in its supply chains so as to im-
prove their employment opportunities.80  Moreover, Ikea has also 
worked diligently to assist refugees outside Syria, partnering with the 
UNHCR in Libya, Chad, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and South Sudan to 
improve basic services and accommodations available in refugee 
camps.81  Further, in its latest initiative, the company has begun to 
hire hundreds (with plans to hire thousands) of Syrian refugees in 
Jordan to manufacture rugs.82  Other companies have followed suit, 
opening training classes in the IT sector to educate and eventually 
hire a new group of tech specialists from among the Syrian refugee 
population in Jordan.83 
There are also instances when a corporation exercises such 
complete control over an area of territory and its employees therein 
 
 80. Brighter Lives for Refugees, IKEA, https://www.ikea.com/gb/en/this-is-
ikea/people-planet/people-communities/good-cause-campaigns/brighter-lives-for-refugees/ 
[https://perma.cc/K38Q-4TTP]; Marcus Fairs, IKEA Aims to Take 200,000 People Out of 
Poverty in Massive Social Sustainability Drive, DEZEEN (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www. 
dezeen.com/2017/04/18/ikea-massive-social-sustainability-drive-production-centres-
refugee-camps-jordan/ [https://perma.cc/7XJM-EKKX]; Azraq, the World’s First Refugee 
Camp Powered by Renewable Energy, Joint UNHCR/IKEA Found., U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR 
REFUGEES (May 17, 2017), http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2017/5/591c079e4/azraq-
worlds-first-refugee-camp-powered-renewable-energy.html [https://perma.cc/R967-8DET]; 
Charlotte Edmon, The World’s First Refugee Camp Powered by Renewable Energy, WORLD 
ECON. FORUM (June 13, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/the-world-s-first-
solar-powered-refugee-camp/ [https://perma.cc/W6E2-9BAG]; Rachel England, How Ikea 
Helped to Change Attitudes on Helping Refugees, INDEPENDENT (May 28, 2017), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/ikea-refugees-help-shelters-attitude-
europe-company-middle-east-syria-a7742576.html [https://perma.cc/8KDD-U89X]. 
 81. UNHCR Corporate Partnerships Programme:  IKEA Foundation, U.N. HIGH 
COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, http://www.unhcr.org/partners/partners/54cb9e8f9/unhcr-ikea-
foundation-partnership-fact-sheet.html [https://perma.cc/VE4N-JBYW]; Altaf Makhiawal, 
Refugee Self-Reliance in Africa Boosted by IKEA Foundation Support:  UNHCR’s Largest 
Private Sector Partner Supports Refugee Families and Host Communities in Ethiopia and 
Burkina Faso, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (July 9, 2015), http://www.unhcr. 
org/news/latest/2015/7/559e919f9/refugee-self-reliance-africa-boosted-ikea-foundation-
support.html [https://perma.cc/DV8D-K3LK]. 
 82. John Reed & Richard Milne, Ikea to Provide Jobs for Syrian Refugees in New 
Jordanian Project, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/35cb00ce-e6ed-
11e6-893c-082c54a7f539 [https://perma.cc/8PAF-XM83]; Fairs, supra note 80. 
 83. Venetia Rainey, Coding Classes Open New Doors for Syrian Good Refugees, AL 
JAZEERA (Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/coding-classes-open-
doors-syrian-refugees-161022080625712.html [https://perma.cc/QB5F-RZQH]. 
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that the business may be understood as a sort of micro- or nascent 
State.  Indeed, the popular press has consistently referred to Fire-
stone’s 220-square-mile rubber plantation in Liberia as a “State with-
in a State.”84  Firestone runs its own schools for employees’ families, 
operates several health clinics, runs its own hospital, employs its own 
security force, provides housing, clean water, and subsidized food, 
and has, at times, even run its own magistrate’s court to administer 
justice.85 
Firestone is not alone.  The steel giant ArcelorMittal has op-
erated a similarly vast plant in Liberia for the last decade through 
which it has also had to provide for its thousands of employees as 
though they were its citizens.86  And, like Firestone, ArcelorMittal 
deployed an advanced and rapid strategy to combat the growing 
threat of Ebola in the surrounding community.87  Thus, though its 
principal iron ore mining concession is situated in one of the worst-
impacted counties, the company suffered only one fatality during the 
entirety of the outbreak.88 
Despite a fizzle of publicity at the time of the Ebola outbreak, 
the activities of both Firestone and ArcelorMittal in combating this 
pandemic have gone largely unconsidered by scholars of internation-
al law.  The next section considers the development of international 
legal scholarship concerning failed and fragile States, the conven-
tional perception of the place of corporations, and the previous utili-
zation of the corporate form in projects of colonial conquest and im-
 
 84. See, e.g., Nicholas Jahr, Workers Organize at Firestone, Liberia’s ‘State Within a 
State,’ THE NATION (July 8, 2010), https://www.thenation.com/article/workers-organize-
firestone-liberias-state-within-state/ [https://perma.cc/CE83-LUQH]; Dan Morgan, Firestone 
Efficiency Shadows Liberian Problems, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 1979), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/03/07/firestone-efficiency-shadows-liberian-
problems/4c547e5e-b372-490a-a5c3-c19717206492/?utm_term=.d17b36407a10 [https:// 
perma.cc/3WZK-JHU6].  See also WILLIAM ROSENAU ET AL., RAND CORP, CORPORATIONS 
AND COUNTERINSURGENCY 17–23 (2009), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ 
occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP259.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2U5-7MJQ]. 
 85. See ROSENAU, supra note 84, at 17–23; DANIEL E. LEE & ELIZABETH J. LEE, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION 115–41 (2010); Morgan, supra note 84. 
 86. See GLOBAL WITNESS, HEAVY MITTAL?:  A STATE WITHIN A STATE 52–55 (2006), 
https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/16825/mittal_steel_en_oct_2006_high_res.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4T2R-QBFW]. 
 87. Erika Fry, Business in the Time of Ebola, FORTUNE (Oct. 30, 2014), 
http://fortune.com/2014/10/30/arcelormittal-business-liberia-ebola-outbreak/ [https://perma. 
cc/PFQ5-6ML5]. 
 88. Liberia:  Responding to Ebola, ARCELORMITTAL, http://corporate.arcelormittal. 
com/sustainability/snapdown-hub/health-liberia-responding-to-ebola [https://perma.cc/ 
TQ85-9FV3]. 
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perial exploitation as factors underlying that perception. 
II. MISSED CONNECTIONS 
Given the rich variation of commercial activity in fragile 
States discussed in Part I, it may be surprising that such activities are 
not more extensively publicized or written about.  Yet, firms may be 
wary that their demonstrated capacity will eventually lead to the gen-
eral imposition of legal obligations that would remove decision-
making in such contexts from the sole purview of the company’s 
management and instead entrust it to international officials or civil 
society activists.89 
Indeed, if it is generally known that Firestone was more effec-
tive in limiting the spread of Ebola than the Liberian State, it may be 
that popular calls will grow to ensure such outcomes going forward 
for the population at large.  Activists might then also demand that 
corporations not merely respect the most basic guarantees of human 
rights law and refrain from violations but also ensure the provision of 
positive socio-economic rights to the communities where they oper-
ate.90 
Various business organizations have already issued state-
ments rejecting the imposition of any direct, quasi-State obligations 
on corporations under international law.  Indeed, when John Ruggie, 
the U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative on the Issue of 
Human Rights, Transnational Corporations, and other Business Enti-
ties, first solicited business comment on his project to formulate 
guidelines with respect to business and human rights, the Internation-
al Organization of Employers (“IOE”) and the International Chamber 
of Commerce (“ICC”) issued a statement reiterating that, with respect 
to human rights, “[g]overnments. . .are the primary duty bearers un-
der international law” and that “[b]usiness can never be, nor should it 
be expected to become, a surrogate government.”91 
 
 89. See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, JOINT VIEWS OF THE IOE AND ICC ON THE 
DRAFT “NORMS ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES WITH REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS” (2004) (expressing concern at the 
possible imposition of international human rights obligations on business actors). 
 90. See Nien-hê Hsieh, Should Business Have Human Rights Obligations?, 14 J. 
HUM. RTS. 218, 223 (2015). 
 91. Business and Human Rights:  The Role of Business in Weak Governance Zones, 
INT’L ORG. OF EMP’RS ¶ 9 (2006), https://www.business-humanrights.org//sites/default/files/ 
reports-and-materials/Role-of-Business-in-Weak-Governance-Zones-Dec-2006.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/BB2K-K2VB]. 
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Yet, despite the forcefulness of the IOE/ICC pronouncement, 
Part I illustrates that business sometimes stands in the gap in failing 
States, discharging public functions when the State cannot. 
The section to come examines why legal scholars may not 
have more closely interrogated such business activities previously, 
particularly given the fairly voluminous literature regarding State-led 
humanitarian intervention and the security threat posed by fragile 
States more generally.  This section suggests that the historically 
State-centric orientation of international law scholarship and the sig-
nificant involvement of firms in now long-discredited colonial en-
deavors have contributed to the relative dearth of legal literature 
grappling with the potential of firms in failed States as constructive 
actors. 
A. Disciplinary Estrangement and the Long Shadow of Colonial 
Corporations 
Transnational corporations have historically posed a conun-
drum for international lawyers.92  These faceless entities, endowed 
with legal personality by the domestic law of their country of incor-
poration, have now come to possess greater wealth and power than 
many States.93  Yet, only States have customarily been designated as 
 
 92. See Jenny S. Martinez, New Territorialism and Old Territorialism, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1387, 1412 (2014) (arguing that “both public and private international law have not 
adequately grappled with the problem of transnational regulation of large multinational 
corporations, and that part of the reason for this failure is the heavy reliance of both fields on 
concepts of territoriality and state-centric sovereignty,” such that the issue “evades a 
completely satisfactory solution”); Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private 
Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801, 802–03 (2002) (observing the persistence of 
a “remarkable confusion” with respect to whether international human rights law applies to 
private corporations); John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights:  The Evolving 
International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819, 819 (2007) (“The state-based system of 
global governance has struggled for more than a generation to adjust to the expanding reach 
and growing influence of transnational corporations.”). 
 93. See Erika R. George, Incorporating Rights:  Empire, Global Enterprise, and 
Global Justice, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 917, 926 (2013) (noting that “[n]early half of the 
world’s largest economic entities are corporations, not countries” and that “[c]ommercial 
enterprises have relative clout in the international arena and revenues that often eclipse the 
GDPs of sovereign states in which they operate”); Erika R. George, The Enterprise of 
Empire:  Evolving Understandings of Corporate Identity and Responsibility, in THE 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE:  MOVING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK 19, 20 (Jena 
Martin & Karen E. Bravo eds., 2016) (observing that “some large multinational corporations 
possess a global influence to rival that of some countries”); Jonathan I. Charney, 
Transnational Corporations and Developing Public International Law, 1983 DUKE L.J. 748, 
768 (declaring that “[n]ation-states aside, TNCs [transnational corporations] are the most 
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subjects of international law, with corporations regulated indirectly, 
by their home State.94 
However, corporations have been present and central since 
the birth of international law as a discipline.95  Indeed, it has almost 
become commonplace to observe that Hugo Grotius, often regarded 
as the father of modern international law, was himself counsel to the 
Dutch East India Company.96  And, in this role, his promotion of the 
principle of the freedom of the high seas was, in part, a self-interested 
exercise in order to ensure the security and efficacy of the company’s 
trading routes.97 
Moreover, European States frequently deployed business or-
ganizations to extend State power and build out the province of em-
pire.98  The pursuit of trading opportunities (and thereby the initiation 
 
powerful actors in the world today and to not recognize that power would be unrealistic”).  
 94. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (7th ed. 2014) (noting that 
“[d]espite the increasing range of actors and participants in the international legal system, 
states remain by far the most important legal persons and despite the rise of globalisation 
and all that this entails, states retain their attraction as the primary focus for the social 
activity of humankind and thus for international law”); 2 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW:  BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 489 (Elihu 
Lauterpacht, ed., 1975); J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS:  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 37–38 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); José E. 
Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1 
(2011); John H. Knox, Horizontal Human Rights, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 47 (2008); Steven 
R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights:  A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE 
L.J. 443 (2001).  But see Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 
1573, 1574–75 (2011) (arguing that “[t]he old understanding of international law as 
something created solely by and for sovereigns is defunct” and that “[t]oday the production 
and enforcement of international law increasingly depends on private actors, not traditional 
political authorities. As with other public services that we used to take for granted—schools, 
prisons, energy utilities, and transportation and telecommunication networks—privatization 
has come to international law.”). 
 95. See José-Manuel Barreto, Cerberus:  Rethinking Grotius and the Westphalian 
System, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EMPIRE:  HISTORICAL EXPLORATIONS 149, 149 (Martti 
Koskenniemi et al. eds., 2017) (arguing that “international law does not only regulate the 
relations between nation states” but that “[s]ince its very inception, modern international law 
has regulated the dealings between states, empires and companies”); George, Enterprise of 
Empire, supra note 93, at 30–48. 
 96. See, e.g., MARTINE JULIA VAN ITTERSUM, PROFIT AND PRINCIPLE:  HUGO GROTIUS, 
NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES AND THE RISE OF DUTCH POWER IN THE EAST INDIES (1595–1615) 
(2006). 
 97. See, e.g., Antony Anghie, The Grotius Lecture:  International Law in a Time of 
Change:  Should International Law Lead or Follow?, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1315, 1319 
(2011); John T. Parry, What is the Grotian Tradition in International Law?, 35 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 299, 326–27, 337 (2013). 
 98. See Philip J. Stern, The English East India Company and the Modern Corporation: 
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of projects of human exploitation and resource plunder) motivated 
territorial expansion, but acting through corporate entities allowed 
the State a lower-risk and less-costly way of undertaking such en-
deavors.99  Indeed, when the Western State lacked capacity, it turned 
to private actors to fill the gap.100  Thus, the deployment of priva-
teers, distinguished from pirates mainly by the letters of marque they 
carried and their commitment to attack only the vessels of certain 
States, was a common technique to extend State power.101  Similarly, 
American corporations operating in Latin America often enjoyed tac-
it and sometimes overt support from the U.S. government when these 
business actors would interfere in the governmental affairs of the 
States in which they conducted business.102 
Yet, by the twentieth century, the scholarly relationship be-
tween corporations and international law was as that of two old 
friends who had drifted apart.103  International law had, by then, 
come to be understood as the exclusive province of the State, where-
as corporations were still largely conceptualized as creatures of do-
mestic law, neither bound directly by nor able themselves to create 
international legal obligations.104  Accordingly, many treaties that set 
out obligations for corporate actors did so, and continue to do so, 
through the vehicle of indirect regulation undertaken by the corpora-
tion’s home State.105  The question of whether corporations are ap-
 
Legacies, Lessons, and Limitations, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 423 (2016); A.J. GRANT ET AL., 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 90–91 (1916) (noting that 
“[i]n India, for example, the flag followed trade” and that “[i]nternal disorder in the country 
drove the Company [British East India Company] to protect itself by gradually developing a 
system of administration, the Company taking upon itself important functions of government 
and becoming a quasi-state”). 
 99. See STEPHEN TULLY, CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 33–37 
(2007).  See also MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS 111–12, 116–
21 (2001).  See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
 100. See PHILIP J. STERN, THE COMPANY-STATE:  CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE 
EARLY MODERN FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA 7 (2011) (asserting that 
“[l]egally and conceptually speaking, the early modern national state and even the monarch 
herself were forms of corporation”). 
 101. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy:  Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s 
Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 210 (2004). 
 102. See Martinez, supra note 92, at 1403–07. 
 103. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 
I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶¶ 37–38 (Feb. 5). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Carlos M. Vazquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under 
International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 927, 930 (2005) (observing that 
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propriately to be regarded as subjects of international law and thus 
bound by international legal obligations has triggered a long-running 
debate.106 
Over successive decades, transnational legal scholars like 
Philip Jessup,107 Detlev Vagts,108 Harold Koh,109 and Anne-Marie 
Slaughter110 have drawn attention to international law’s stultified fo-
cus on the State as the sole actor of import in the global community 
and critiqued this practice as artificial and false.  As such, these 
scholars contributed substantially to the development of the field of 
International Business Transactions as an area of scholarly inquiry so 
as to engage with transnational interchange or global private ordering 
through and beyond the State.111  However, even in some recent 
scholarship examining the role of corporate interests in the produc-
tion of international law, a certain hostility to the engagement of 
 
“[i]nternational law, as it exists today, includes norms that address the conduct of 
corporations and other non-state actors, but, with every few exceptions, the norms do so by 
imposing an obligation on states to regulate non-state actors,” such that “for the most part, 
international law regulates such non-state actors indirectly”).  The tripartite structure of the 
International Labour Organization, which includes representatives of States, employers, and 
workers in its Governing Body is the rare exception to this rule.  See INT’L LABOR ORG. 
CONSTITUTION, art. 7, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_ 
LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO#A7 [https://perma.cc/RA66-ZL33]. 
 106. See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 182 (7th ed. 2014) (observing 
that “[t]he question of the international personality of transnational corporations remains an 
open one”); Rebecca M. Bratspies, “Organs of Society”:  A Plea for Human Rights 
Accountability for Transnational Enterprises and Other Business Entities, 13 MICH. ST. J. 
INT’L L. 9, 11 (2005) (noting that “[b]ecause TNEs [transnational business enterprises] 
operate across national borders, beyond the constraints of any one nation’s domestic law, 
their actions are too often viewed as beyond the reach of any law” and that “[t]his unique 
ability to elude national legal systems makes TNEs ripe for greater investigation under 
international law”). 
 107. See generally PHILLIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956). 
 108. See Detlev F. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise:  A New Challenge for 
Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739, 789–91 (1970). 
 109. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 
YALE L.J. 2599, 2624–29 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 
NEB. L. REV. 181, 184–85 (1996); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 745, 746 (2005). 
 110. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations 
Theory:  A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205, 227–28 (1993).  See generally ANNE-
MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). 
 111. See Mathias Reimann, From the Law of Nations to Transnational Law:  Why We 
Need a New Basic Course for the International Curriculum, 22 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 397, 
412–13 (2004).  See also Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change, 
37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 229, 233–35 (2012). 
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business actors is apparent.112 
In line with this trajectory, the legacy of international law’s 
statist focus is particularly palpable in the scholarship concerning 
failed and fragile States.113  Indeed, that literature largely excludes 
business actors.  The prevailing scholarly approach seems instead to 
start from the premise that because State failure is a breakdown in the 
basic unit of international governance, it is for other actors in this 
category (States or groups of States, namely international organiza-
tions) to respond to such challenges.  States fix broken States and so 
the possible constructive functions of corporations are minimized and 
obscured.114 
International institutions have begun to take note of and build 
upon the quasi-State functions discharged by some of the businesses 
discussed in Part I,115 but most scholarship has lagged behind.116  
 
 112. See Melissa J. Durkhee, Astroturf Activism, 69 STAN. L. REV. 201 (2017).  See also 
Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229 (2015). 
 113. See supra note 94; see also supra note 103. 
 114. John Yoo, Fixing Failed States, 99 CAL. L. REV. 95, 98 (2011) (“[N]ation-states 
remain the most important actors with the capacity to fix failed states. . . . Removing 
obstacles in international law and policy to intervention in failed state will more effectively 
allow nation-states to tackle the problem.”). 
 115. See U.N. GLOB. COMPACT, supra note 29, at 6 (observing that “[t]he primary 
responsibility for peace, security and development rests with governments, but the private 
sector can make a meaningful contribution to stability and security in conflict-affected and 
high-risk areas”); Peschka, supra note 37, at 3–7 (noting that “the private sector continues to 
operate even during the most violent situations” and that “in places like Somalia, Sudan, and 
Afghanistan, the lack of any effective central government presence may lead the local 
private sector to provide services normally expected from the government”); AFRICAN DEV. 
BANK GRP., supra note 25, at 22–25 (affirming that “[w]eak institutional capacity is a key 
feature of fragile situations and significantly impairs the state’s ability to deliver public 
goods and services.  Along with efforts to strengthen public institutions, the Bank will 
provide greater support for the use of non-state actors, notably the private sector and civil 
society, in delivering the services within a public framework that places the state in a 
regulatory and commissioning role.”). 
 116. See ZACHARIAH CHERIAN MAMPILLY, REBEL RULERS:  INSURGENT GOVERNANCE 
AND CIVILIAN LIFE DURING WAR 7 (2015) (describing the “state-centric tendency, especially 
visible within political science studies of governance” as “understandable though 
problematic, for it implies a basic Hobbesian conjecture—that is, if the state is not capable 
of exerting control, then chaos must ensue,” such that “scholars thus far have not adequately 
accounted for the performance of governmental functions by nonstate actors”).  See also 
IQBAL & STARR, supra note 27, at 125 (observing that “instead of limiting our attention to 
intervention efforts by the United Nations and regional institutions, we could turn to how 
private entities—such as multinational corporations—play [or might play] a role in keeping 
states from collapsing:  specifically, how that role could be better managed to have a positive 
influence on fragile states with high risk of failure, rather than merely subjecting these 
societies to the pernicious effects of the ‘dark side of globalization,’” but also admitting that 
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Some attention has been paid to private security firms and their ac-
tions in zones of weak governance, but little else is said of the poten-
tial of companies in shoring up the fragile State.117  Though some 
scholars have discussed the territorial administrative functions of in-
ternational organizations with respect to States undergoing periods of 
transition and upheaval, few have focused on business actors that 
discharge similar tasks.118 
In parallel, several scholars have begun to think through how 
other non-State actors, particularly rebel groups, perform State-like 
functions in settings of State fragility.119  But the objective of the ac-
tors at the core of these studies is to attain the status and power of the 
State.  Indeed, for the law of international responsibility, if these non-
State actors obtain State power, their actions become attributable to 
 
“[i]n the absence of extant large-scale analyses, we are not in a position to assert whether the 
involvement of/with private entities would benefit a weak or failing state; we merely point to 
it as a future direction for further investigation of the concept and phenomenon of state 
failure.”). 
 117. See, e.g., LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE:  PRESERVING 
PUBLIC VALUES IN A WORLD OF PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2011); Laura A. Dickinson, 
Government for Hire:  Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 135 (2005); PETER SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS:  THE RISE OF THE 
PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003). 
 118. For notable exceptions, see Simon Chesterman, Lawyers, Guns, and Money:  The 
Governance of Business Activities in Conflict Zones, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 321, 324 (2010) 
(arguing that “the norms governing businesses in conflict zones are both understudied and 
undervalued—understudied because the focus is generally on human rights of universal 
application, rather than the narrower regime of international humanitarian law [IHL], and 
undervalued because IHL may provide a more certain foundation for real norms that can be 
applied to businesses and the individuals who control them”); Jide Nzelibe, When the 
Multinational Meets the Patrimonial State:  Prospects for Improving Transnational 
Liability, 5 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 417 (1996).  On the phenomenon of territorial administration 
by international organizations, see RALPH WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL 
ADMINISTRATION:  HOW TRUSTEESHIP AND THE CIVILIZING MISSION NEVER WENT AWAY 
(2008); ERIC DE BRABANDERE, POST-CONFLICT ADMINISTRATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:  
INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY AND FOREIGN 
OCCUPATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 99–100 (2009); GREGORY H. FOX, HUMANITARIAN 
OCCUPATION (2008); Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the 
Laws of War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 580 (2006). 
 119. See ZACHARIAH CHERIAN MAMPILLY, REBEL RULERS:  INSURGENT GOVERNANCE 
AND CIVILIAN LIFE DURING WAR (2011); José Ciro Martínez & Brent Eng, Struggling to 
Perform the State:  The Politics of Bread in the Syrian Civil War, 11 INT’L POL. SOC. 130 
(2017) (describing the performance of the State through the provision of bread to civilians); 
Double-Edged Sword:  Vigilantes in African Counter-Insurgencies, INT’L CRISIS GROUP 
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/sierra-leone/251-double-
edged-sword-vigilantes-african-counter-insurgencies [https://perma.cc/U6F7-WK5P]. 
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the State itself.120 
Relatedly, the drive to treat corporations as subjects of inter-
national law amenable to suit for violations of international law is 
premised on the belief that some governmental actor or source of 
public authority must restrain business.  Corporations, so this narra-
tive proceeds with respect to fragile States, are often at least as pow-
erful as the States in which they operate and so must be held ac-
countable through international law when their actions cause harm 
because of their tendency to do social harm when not restrained by 
some governmental apparatus.121 
Thus, some scholars have argued as an alternative that corpo-
rations should be treated as subjects of international law (thereby ac-
countable for violations of that body of law) when they act like the 
State.122  Still others have argued that corporations ought to be ame-
nable to suit for violations of international law merely by virtue of 
their wealth and influence, regardless of whether they are undertak-
ing State-like or purely private tasks.123 
Yet, the common thread throughout this line of thinking is the 
emphasis on the necessity of an accountability paradigm in framing 
the interconnectedness of corporations, international law, and fragile 
States.  If national authorities either in the corporation’s home State 
or in the territory of operation are unwilling or unable to hold the 
corporation to account, it is for the superstructure of international law 
to facilitate the enforcement of such legal sanctions.124 
 
 120. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 art. 10(1) (Sept. 6, 2001) [hereinafter ARSIWA] (“The 
conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new Government of a State shall 
be considered an act of that State under international law.”). 
 121. Austen L. Parrish, Rehabilitating Territoriality in Human Rights, 32 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1099, 1128 (2011) (arguing that “[s]trong territorial states are essential for effective 
enforcement of human rights norms against multi-national and transnational corporations”). 
 122. See FLORIAN WETTSTEIN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE:  
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF A QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTION (2009); Ratner, 
supra note 94, 497–506. 
 123. See MARKOS KARAVIAS, CORPORATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 2–
3 (2013); David Weissbrodt & Maria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 
97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 901 (2003) (arguing that “[w]ith power should come responsibility”). 
 124. Anita Ramasastry, Corporation Complicity:  From Nuremberg to Rangoon—an 
Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational 
Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91, 118 (2002) (arguing that “[t]he issue of MNC 
[multinational corporation] culpability should be assessed in terms of the level, degree and 
duration of complicity, and the context in which that complicity occurs,” such that “MNCs 
that work with repressive regimes today arguably present a stronger case for the imposition 
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In contrast, the literature on corporate social responsibility 
seeks to cultivate a consciousness of social reputation to motivate 
business actors to do good through the pressure of consumer choice 
and civil society activism.125  Corporate social responsibility empha-
sizes the social reasons, particularly social pressure from consumers 
and decisionmakers in more lucrative markets, for corporations to 
contribute to economic development and the expansion of infrastruc-
ture and services in the places in which they operate.  Yet, here again 
an understanding of the necessity of an external constraint on the 
pursuit of profit (here, social pressure rather than legal sanction) is 
present.126  This Article may be understood as an application of cor-
porate social responsibility, but, as the analysis to come will seek to 
demonstrate, the Article seeks to extend those insights further by ex-
amining situations where such external constraint has been largely 
absent. 
As a consequence of these parallel trends emphasizing legal 
and social constraints on the private sector and the concomitant 
communal pressure, business actors have agreed to join a variety of 
codes of conduct and reporting mechanisms that represent under-
standings of international best practices in the area.127  But here 
 
of liability” because “such MNCs are acting purely for profit rather than out of the national 
interest”). 
 125. See, e.g., Erika R. George & Scarlet R. Smith, In Good Company:  How Corporate 
Social Responsibility Can Protect Rights and Aid Efforts to End Child Sex Trafficking and 
Modern Slavery, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 55, 58 (2013) (asserting that “corporate social 
responsibility is becoming a competitive imperative as it informs the consumers’ decisions 
to patronize an establishment and the investors’ decision to purchase shares in a particular 
corporation” such that “conduct consistent with emerging global norms on the responsibility 
of business to respect human rights is advisable”). 
 126. See, e.g., MUCHLINSKI, supra note 31, at 100–01 (noting that “[t]he ‘international 
corporate social responsibility’ [ICSR] of MNEs [Multinational Enterprises] can be seen as a 
response to popular perceptions concerning the loss of corporate accountability as an effect 
of economic globalization”). 
 127. See, e.g., U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ 
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/N62V-ZLW4]; OECD, OECD 
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011), http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ 
guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/L7VB-M3Y5]; INT’L LABOUR ORG., TRIPARTITE DECLARATION 
OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY (5th ed. 
2017), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_emp/—-emp_ent/—-multi/ 
documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZC3X-K3TM].  See also Sean 
D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 403–20 (2005); August Reinisch, The Changing International Legal 
Framework for Dealing with Non-State Actors, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
37, 43–46 (Philip Alston ed., 2005). 
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again, one may observe the influence of the premise that some exter-
nal surveillance (here, transnational codes and transparency initia-
tives in the corporation’s State of nationality) is required to ensure 
that a business acts in an ethical way. 
Yet, it should also be noted that given the historical record of 
for-profit firms operating in some of the countries we now regard as 
failed or fragile States, the dearth of extended analyses of their so-
cially constructive capacity might be regarded as reasonable.  Indeed, 
for-profit firms have been harnessed by imperial States for their co-
lonial projects over the centuries.128  Joint-stock corporations have 
been particularly important vehicles for territorial expansion and ad-
ministration of foreign peoples when the mother country either 
lacked the institutional capacity or the financial resolve to undertake 
such projects directly.129  But, imperial States like England, France, 
Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium also governed lands and peoples 
overseas through the colonial corporate form to ensure maximum 
profit with minimal social investment.130  In addition, scholars have 
increasingly brought to the fore the imperial underpinning of the 
modern United States and the significant role of business interests in 
this country’s breathtaking geographic expansion over the course of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.131 
Of course, many of these projects were undertaken at the di-
rection or encouragement of States.  The corporate form merely pro-
vided a convenient legal vehicle for the structuring of the governance 
project and so this might be an important distinction to draw between 
these earlier highly problematic endeavors and those highlighted in 
Part I. 
Another important distinction relates to the general legal 
 
 128. See generally Jeffrey Herbst, STATES AND POWER IN AFRICA:  COMPARATIVE 
LESSONS IN AUTHORITY AND CONTROL (2000); MIGUEL A. CENTENO, BLOOD AND DEBT:  
WAR AND STATEMAKING IN LATIN AMERICA (2002). 
 129. See generally H.V. BOWEN, THE BUSINESS OF EMPIRE:  THE EAST INDIA COMPANY 
AND IMPERIAL BRITAIN, 1756–1833 (2008). 
 130. STEVEN PRESS, ROGUE EMPIRES:  CONTRACTS AND CONMEN IN EUROPE’S SCRAMBLE 
FOR AFRICA (2017); Julia Adams & Steven Pincus, Imperial States in the Age of Discovery, 
in THE MANY HANDS OF THE STATE:  THEORIZING POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND SOCIAL 
CONTROL 333 (Kimberly J. Morgan & Ann Shola Orloff eds., 2017); Antony Anghie, 
Finding the Peripheries:  Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International 
Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 37 (1999) (observing that administrative problems associated 
with colonial governance through corporations flowed naturally from the fact that “the 
territories were administered simply for profit”). 
 131. PAUL FRYMER, BUILDING AN AMERICAN EMPIRE:  THE ERA OF TERRITORIAL AND 
POLITICAL EXPANSION 42–43 (2017); JACK P. GREENE, CREATING THE BRITISH ATLANTIC: 
ESSAYS ON TRANSPLANTATION, ADAPTATION, AND CONTINUITY 102–12 (2013). 
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backdrop currently and that prevailing during these colonial and qua-
si-colonial enterprises.  Indeed, though the effectiveness of interna-
tional law may be underplayed by some, we must acknowledge a 
prevailing, even if imperfectly executed, understanding today that 
various acts—slavery, genocide, conquest of the territory of another 
State—are generally impermissible and reprehensible.  And the effect 
of these norms on business conduct too provides a distinction be-
tween now and earlier eras when such understandings were not gen-
erally shared.  The impact of these developments may be seen in the 
voluntary subscription of business actors to a variety of corporate 
codes of conduct discussed above that articulate these norms in 
greater detail. 
Given this history, however, foreign business activity in frag-
ile States will surely raise the specter of past colonial projects.  How-
ever, this concern is not unique to the private sector.  Various human-
itarian intervention missions conducted by foreign States and 
international organizations have been criticized in this way.  The ob-
jective of this Article is to acknowledge that past and ensure that it is 
not replicated, but also encourage the international community to 
think in ways that transcend the bounds of that colonial paradigm so 
as to better harness and facilitate the socially constructive capacities 
of for-profit firms.  It is toward a better understanding of that task 
that the next section now turns. 
III. PUBLIC GOODS, PROFIT, AND SOVEREIGNTY 
This section builds a model to explain when for-profit firms 
are more likely to provide public goods by discharging the kinds of 
quasi-governmental functions outlined in Part I.  It utilizes the con-
ceptualization of these firms as semi-States in order to draw from in-
ternational law theory and understandings of State behavior rooted 
therein to construct a more capacious theory of profit and its compat-
ibility with social gain.  This section then deploys economic and or-
ganizational theory concerning firm behavior generally, and more 
specifically firm behavior in the context of fragile States, to show 
that firms operating in such environments often perform quasi-
governmental tasks to enhance a sort of reputation-based social capi-
tal that facilitates market functionality in the short-term and also en-
hances their long-term outlook. 
This section posits that a firm will perform State functions or 
provide public goods when it is able to capture a sufficiently large 
portion of the benefit so as to justify the marginal cost of providing 
the good or service.  However, it suggests that benefit ought to be 
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construed broadly so as to make clear that, in the fragile State con-
text, firms often operate in a manner that defies simple accounting 
and instead pursue long-term gain through reputation-building pro-
jects that allow them to amass social capital.  However, that reputa-
tion gain may be diminished and the provision of public goods may 
be dissuaded by laws that discourage or actively punish operating in 
the territory and also by social perceptions that such operations are 
somehow illegitimate because they take place in areas of limited 
statehood.  This last set of concerns is addressed in Part IV. 
This section then considers the normative desirability of these 
activities.  In doing so, it also squarely faces an oft-heard critique:  
that firms will more often than not “put profits over people” and ac-
cordingly act in a manner that is deleterious to the local population 
when not restrained by State actors.132  At its most extreme, that posi-
tion may seem something of a straw man, perhaps, but it also oper-
ates as an important perception shading the choices of decisionmak-
ers and those seeking to write, implement, and deploy law in this 
area, and so it must be addressed here.  Given the significance of that 
perception and its historical groundings in the utilization of colonial 
corporations by States outlined in Part II, it is important to have an 
understanding of when firms acting independently will engage in so-
cially constructive behavior.  But, this section also explores reasons 
for hesitation and concern rooted in alternative conceptualizations of 
State sovereignty. 
A. Decisionmaking in the Absence of External Constraint 
For-profit firms performing State-like functions in areas of 
limited statehood are not States.  However, they sometimes operate 
as so-called “functional equivalents” to the State, filling gaps in the 
 
 132. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit:  Transnational Corporations and 
Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 48–49 (2002) (examining “the largely 
uncontrolled human rights danger posed by multinationals” and asserting “the harsh reality 
that corporations often profit from abusive behavior”); OXFAM, UNIVERSAL HEALTH 
COVERAGE:  WHY HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEMES ARE LEAVING THE POOR BEHIND 15 (2013), 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp176-universal-health-
coverage-091013-en__3.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8ZU-VZ65] (arguing that “health care 
providers and insurance companies are maximizing profits by gaming the system”).  See also 
Jessica Glenza, Ban Ki-Moon Urges US to Shun ‘Powerful Interests’ and Adopt Universal 
Healthcare, GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/ 
nov/09/ban-ki-moon-us-universal-healthcare [https://perma.cc/PRX8-EY8B] (quoting 
former U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon as observing that “you simply cannot reach 
universal health coverage if your health system is dominated by private financing” because 
such actors “prioritize profit over care”). 
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provision of public services or exercising a degree of authority or ter-
ritorial control ordinarily associated with government actors.133  This 
subsection highlights parallels between these firms and States so as to 
predict the operation of firms in areas lacking effective State over-
sight by applying insights derived from the behavior of States in the 
international community.134 
States often make decisions and take action without fear of 
immediate external sanction.135  The international system lacks a cen-
tral legislature or executive, and, with a very limited set of excep-
tions, its principal judicial bodies only take jurisdiction if the State 
subject to the potential adjudication of the dispute consents.  En-
forcement is, thus, one of the critical challenges of international law. 
Scholars have discussed at length alternative means through 
which the international system enforces its rules, arguing variously 
that States punish lawbreakers through reputational sanction and that 
constituencies of citizens, politicians, and civil society groups inter-
nal to States play an important role in ensuring that States obey inter-
national law.  Moreover, a significant body of scholarship has instead 
focused on creating a culture of compliance internalized by deci-
sionmakers rather than relying on the necessity of sanction.136 
 
 133. See Hans Krause Hansen, Policing Corruption Post- and Pre-Crime:  Collective 
Action and Private Authority in the Maritime Industry, 25 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 131, 
137–38 (2018); Tanja A. Börzel & Thomas Risse, Dysfunctional State Institutions, Trust, 
and Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, 10 REG. & GOVERNANCE 149, 150–51 
(2016); Stephen D. Krasner & Thomas Risse, External Actors, State-Building, and Service 
Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood:  Introduction, 27 GOVERNANCE 545 (2014); Tanja 
A. Börzel et al., Does It Really Take the State? 12 BUS. & POL. 1, 2–30 (2012); Tobias 
Debiel et al, Local State-Building in Afghanistan and Somaliland, 21 PEACE REV. 38, 38–43 
(2009). 
 134. See U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, ¶ 1 (Aug. 26, 2003) (declaring that “[w]ithin their respective 
spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and 
protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law”).  See also U.N. 
Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2003/16, Rep. of the U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights on its Fifty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/2, at 52 (Oct. 
20, 2003) (approving the Draft Norms).  But see Philip Alston, The ‘Not-a-Cat’ Syndrome:  
Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in NON-
STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 13–14 (2005) (critiquing the concept of spheres of 
influence). 
 135. MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:  
INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 69 (2008). 
 136. RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES:  PROMOTING HUMAN 
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This enforcement conundrum presents a useful point of inter-
section between States and for-profit firms that maintain operations 
in failed or fragile States.  The firm’s State of nationality, or where it 
is “at home,”137 could conceivably regulate and restrain business ac-
tivities elsewhere through the robust exercise of extraterritorial juris-
diction.138  However, these efforts have largely proven unsatisfactory 
to advocates of legal accountability for a variety of reasons.139 
First, judicial principles of territorialism often dictate that it is 
only appropriate for the State in whose territory the alleged injuries 
or violations occurred to adjudicate and prescribe with respect to the 
acts in question.140  Second, if conceptualized through the methodol-
ogy of interest analysis,141 which functions as an alternative method-
ology to territorialist approaches to the conflict of laws, the firm’s ac-
tivities seemingly do not usually implicate fundamental interests of 
its home State because injuries likely impacted foreigners and the 
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Do Nations?, supra note 109, at 2645–56. 
 137. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014). 
 138. Anthony J. Colangelo, What is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
1303, 1343–44 (2014). 
 139. See Ratner, supra note 94, at 463, 536 (arguing that “as firms have become more 
international, they have also become ever more independent of government control” and that 
“[i]f the host state fails to regulate the acts of the company, other states, including the state 
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extraterritorial nature of the acts at issue.”); Singer, supra note 117 at 536–37; Jide Nzelibe, 
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INT’L L. & BUS. 475, 509–10 (2013); Charney, supra note 93, at 749 (observing that “one 
country usually cannot unilaterally regulate TNC [transnational corporations] power and 
behavior”); Marina Caparini, Domestic Regulation:  Licensing Regimes for the Export of 
Military Goods and Services, in FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET 158–78 (Simon 
Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007). 
 140. Ieva Miluna, Jurisdictional Competence and Applicable Criminal Law with Regard 
to Private Military and Security Companies, in MULTILEVEL REGULATION OF MILITARY AND 
SECURITY CONTRACTORS:  THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND 
DOMESTIC NORMS 529, 531–34 (Christine Bakker & Mirko Sossai eds., 2012); Martinez, 
supra note 92, 1393–95; Brief of Chevron Corporation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 3–8, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (No. 10-
1491). 
 141. Herma Hill Kay, Currie’s Interest Analysis in the 21st Century:  Losing the Battle, 
But Winning the War, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 123, 124 (2001) (defining the “bottom line” 
of interest analysis as an approach to conflict of laws which prescribed that “the forum court 
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conduct causing such harms occurred overseas.142  Indeed, the con-
nection to and interest of the home State become even more attenuat-
ed if the firm acts through some foreign subsidiary or overseas con-
tractor, thereby implicating issues of competing sovereignty over the 
regulation of entities (subsidiaries and local contractors) arguably 
within the regulatory scope of other States.143  Finally, certain na-
tional courts previously receptive to transnational litigation have 
proven increasingly hostile to such cases, constructing procedural 
and prudential doctrines to avoid having to decide such cases.144 
Accordingly, it may be said that business actors in failed and 
fragile States are subject to limited traditional legal constraints be-
cause the State in which they conduct their activities is unable to en-
force its own regulations and the firm’s home State may not be will-
ing to enforce its own laws with respect to operations abroad.145 
However, a crucial fault line in both studies of corporate so-
cial responsibility and international law has been whether corpora-
tions and States obey law out of self-interest so as to avoid sanction 
(construed either as direct punishment or harm to profits) or whether 
such obedience stems from an understanding of obedience as obliga-
tory or in some way morally desirable.  The question that often fol-
lows, then, is whether the community ought to seek to ensure that a 
State or business complies with law by explaining and enhancing the 
potentially deleterious consequences of non-compliance or instead by 
fostering an attitude that such obedience to law is good and thus de-
sirable for that reason alone.146 
 
 142. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013) (holding that 
“even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so 
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application”). 
 143. Chesterman, supra note 118, at 333 (observing that “[i]t is frequently asserted that 
private military companies such as Blackwater operate in a legal vacuum” but that “[t]his is 
simply not true” because “[i]n theory, at least, they are subject to the laws of the land in 
which they are operating, in particular its criminal law.”  Yet, the Article acknowledges that 
“[i]n practice, however, these companies operate in places with weak or dysfunctional legal 
systems” and that though “contractors have been tried and convicted of crimes . . . such trials 
are exceptional.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 414 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1987). 
 144. Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (2015). 
 145. See Tanja A. Börzel & Thomas Risse, Governance Without a State:  Can it Work?, 
4 REG. & GOVERNANCE 113, 121 (2010) (asserting that “[t]he anarchy problem in areas of 
limited statehood closely resembles the international system in the absence of an enforcer or 
a hegemon,” such that “[t]ransnational or global governance has to cope with the problem 
that there is no world state to ensure compliance with costly rules.”). 
 146. See Larry Cata Backer, Corporate Social Responsibility in Weak Governance 
Zones, 14 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 297, 319–21 (2016). 
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Of course, the choice might seem to represent a false dichot-
omy, since profit and morality may align.  Consequently, corporate 
social responsibility proponents often seek to persuade companies to 
undertake socially conscious activities by explaining the potential 
profitability of such decisions.147  Scholars seeking to unpack the rel-
atively strong rate of State compliance with international law have 
put forward the importance of reputational benefit or harm to explain 
compliance.148 
Invariably, however, there are times when profit does not ap-
pear immediately to align with activities that are either obligatory or 
that seem to go beyond the standard that law prescribes.  In both cor-
porate and international law, scholars have argued that actors under 
such perceived constraints will not comply if it is unprofitable to do 
so.  In business law, the outer constraint of non-profitable activity is 
assumed to be imposed and enforced by the State.149  In international 
law, realists like Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner have argued that 
States act under no independent obligation to comply with interna-
tional law when it deviates from their own self-interest, since interna-
tional law is merely a euphemism for self-interest.150 
Yet, this model of pure self-interest begins to break down 
when we appraise decisionmaking based not merely on singular deci-
sion points or choices when confronted with a particular situation but 
on the basis of long-term planning.151  In this sense, the actors in-
volved may be seen to act against their own self-interest where self-
interest is understood merely in terms of the immediate profit to be 
reaped from a single choice.  As such, if faced with the choice of vio-
lating the human rights of nearby inhabitants to build a road for 
transporting valuable minerals and building a road in a manner that 
does not violate the rights of those inhabitants, say through consulta-
tion and fair compensation, we would expect the firm to act in a 
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manner that is compatible with long-term viability because humans 
are planning agents and a firm that undertakes such a project will 
have had to consider the legal routes available.152  Moreover, if the 
firm has had a long history of operating in the community or requires 
the continued good will of nearby residents, we would expect the de-
cision to skew in favor of the choice that respects human rights be-
cause the formulation of plans will have been a key component of the 
activity.153 
Further, if the firm and its managers have committed to one of 
the various voluntary codes of good conduct that prescribe adherence 
to human rights, we would also expect that obligation to be incorpo-
rated into the firm’s long-term planning.154  Thus, though the seem-
ingly voluntary nature may be critiqued, it does parallel the interna-
tional lawmaking process whereby States are only bound through 
their consent unless the underlying norm is customary or a norm of 
so-called jus cogens (peremptory law).155  Such codes provide not 
merely a standard against which to measure corporate behavior and 
possible liability, but perhaps more importantly, they provide a 
means of coordination, agreement, and public reporting as to best 
practices that may lead to processes of internalizing such norms with-
in firm decisionmaking.  Thus, once incorporated into a long-term 
plan, these norms often prove sticky and begin to exert a stronger 
pull toward compliance.156 
 
 152. Id. at 105, 125 (noting that “[t]he key here is that rationality is evaluated in larger 
chunks, not isolated decision points.  So the correct definition of rationality is that an 
action’s rationality is evaluated with regard to its place within a larger, rationally justified 
plan.”). 
 153. See Dirk Hanekom & John Manuel Luiz, The Impact of Multinational Enterprises 
on Public Governance Institutions in Areas of Limited Statehood, 55 MGMT. DECISION 1736, 
1737 (2017) (asserting that “the results reveal a relationship between the depth of country 
embeddedness and the level of engagement of MNEs [multinational enterprises] with public 
institutions, and this is related to issues around risk mitigation and time horizons.  Deeper 
embeddedness in the local markets brings greater exposure to risk leading to more and wider 
engagement in governance processes and cross-sector collaborations in order to influence 
these concerns.”). 
 154. Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 403, 
409–12 (2000) (observing that “establishing a commitment as a legal rule invokes a 
particular form of discourse” because “[a]lthough actors may disagree about the 
interpretation or applicability of a set of rules, discussion of issues purely in terms of 
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 155. Id. at 412 (noting that “[o]ver time, even nonbinding declarations can shape the 
practices of states and other actors and their expectations of appropriate conduct, leading to 
the emergence of customary law or the adoption of harder agreements”). 
 156. Kenneth Amaeshi & Olufemi O. Amao, Corporate Social Responsibility in 
Transnational Spaces:  Exploring Influences of Varieties of Capitalism on Expressions of 
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That this does not occur in every instance, and the fact that 
firms sometimes make a choice that violates human rights does not 
necessarily diminish the accuracy of the insight.  Indeed, criminal 
behavior does not ordinarily obscure the force or value of domestic 
law, and similarly violations of international law do not necessarily 
mean that the international system is without value or merit.  Instead, 
our concern ought to be with ensuring the sincerity and strength of 
the firm’s internalization of legal norms. 
Accordingly, we may rightly be skeptical of operations of 
transnational corporations in fragile States undertaken through their 
subsidiaries.157  One challenge with subsidiaries is that they allow for 
the potential of a singular transaction.  As such, the firm may choose 
between pure self-interest and legal obligation in a singular interac-
tion because the subsidiary may be discarded at the conclusion of the 
transaction.  The reputation and potential liability of the parent com-
pany is not necessarily at jeopardy, and thus the long-term calcula-
tion, or at least, uncertainty that may point toward legal compliance 
is reduced to a more simplistic computation.  This will not be the 
case with every subsidiary, of course, and some subsidiaries are more 
embedded in the fragile State or adhere more closely to the pro-
nounced corporate social responsibility policies of the parent compa-
ny, but the potential exploitation of operations through subsidiaries is 
a challenge.158 
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 157. Sergio Puig, The Internationalization of Tobacco Tactics, 28 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 495, 515–18 (2018) (discussing the exploitation of subsidiaries by multinational 
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Similarly, the fungibility and disposability of businesses 
structured through large, multi-tiered supply chains, such as Walmart 
and Apple, presents a further problem for regulating global business 
activity, particularly in the context of fragile and failed States.159  
Though such actors are significant in terms of the economic activity 
that they represent, it should be made clear that their activities are not 
the main focus of this Article, since the point of such structuring 
through supply chains is often to evade or avoid any sense of respon-
sibility for the discharge of governance functions.  When it is incon-
venient to source an item from a particular location, the company’s 
supply chain can often shift fairly easily to producers in another loca-
tion (unless the resource, product, or commodity sourced in the first 
location is somehow unique).  Moreover, because employees of the 
various contracted suppliers are not Walmart or Apple employees, 
those companies are less likely to take on the provision of public ser-
vices for that set of workers or members of those communities.160 
B. Uncertainty, Trust, and Social Capital 
Though the foregoing account may have addressed the objec-
tions of those skeptical of allowing firms to maintain any presence in 
fragile States for fear that their behavior unconstrained by the host 
State will lead to wanton illegality, it does not do enough to explain 
or predict why firms might surpass the baseline legal standard of re-
specting human rights and instead undertake quasi-governmental 
functions quite beyond what is legally required of them.  To gain a 
better understanding of this phenomenon, this subsection grapples 
with the question of decisionmaking under conditions of uncertainty 
and risk.  Such conditions are ever-present for business operations in 
failed or fragile States that represent a particularly fraught sub-
classification of the business theory category of so-called emerging 
markets. 
Firms operating in failed and fragile States often do so absent 
 
of a MNC’s [multinational corporation’s] nationality, we posit that the more a MNC is 
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(2009). 
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(Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017). 
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the stability or guaranteed security of the State.  Traditional econom-
ic accounts assume the presence of the State as both a guarantor of 
property interests and enforcer of regulation that governs firm activi-
ties and enables general market functionality.161  The State thus ordi-
narily provides a degree of predictability for firms taking decisions 
and making plans.  But without the State, this predictability begins to 
crumble. 
Indeed, fragile States are characterized by a series of institu-
tional voids, whereby the State is unable to supply the regulatory or 
enforcement framework provided in more developed markets to en-
sure sustained commerce.162  Institutional voids occur in the broader 
category of emerging markets, but the problem is particularly acute 
in the context of failed and fragile States. 
To make up for this seeming absence of governance, econom-
ic actors instead form parallel institutions to provide for a degree of 
self-regulation and to ensure the predictability of transactions.163  
Such institutions are fundamentally cooperative, requiring that actors 
build relationships to exploit their own advantageous capacities.164  
And thus, it may be argued that the quasi-State activities outlined 
above give business actors a way to construct such relationships in 
and among communities.165  Where business actors must ensure se-
curity, payment either to their own security services or to protection 
rackets run by other non-State actors will often suffice.166  Yet, in 
situations of conflict or rapidly-moving upheaval, information is at a 
premium because it allows for more accurate planning.  In such envi-
ronments, paying to build communal relationships through the provi-
sion of the sorts of quasi-governmental services or products dis-
 
 161. AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS:  ALTERNATIVE MODES OF 
GOVERNANCE 13 (2004) (asserting that “conventional economic theory . . . takes the 
existence of a well-functioning institute of state law for granted” even though the reality is 
instead that “[o]nly advanced countries in recent times come anywhere near the economist’s 
ideal picture.”). 
 162. Cheng Gao et al., Overcoming Institutional Voids:  A Reputation Based View of 
Long-Run Survival, 38 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 2147, 2148–50 (2017); Tarun Khanna & 
Krishnan Palepu, Why Focused Strategies May Be Wrong for Emerging Markets, 75 HARV. 
BUS. REV. 41, 41–48 (1997). 
 163. DIXIT, supra note 161, at 3, 5 (proposing that in fragile States firms establish 
“alternative institutions to provide the necessary economic governance” and that these 
alternative institutions “include self-protection or hired professional protection for property 
rights . . . networks of information transmission, and social norms and punishments for 
contract enforcement.”). 
 164. Id. at 32, 65. 
 165. Id. at 129–31. 
 166. Id. at 100, 107–08, 133. 
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cussed in Part I may be categorized as a potentially profit-
maximizing but also socially beneficial activity. 
Moreover, without the authoritative imprimatur of the State, 
such alternative institutions require trust among actors based on repu-
tation.167  Reputation is thus crucial to long-term survival in emerg-
ing markets, and so it may be that discharging the kinds of quasi-
State activities discussed earlier allows for firms to demonstrate both 
their commitment to a particular locale and to bank social capital that 
may prove useful down the line.168  Commercial decisions in such 
markets are often taken against a backdrop of uncertainty, and repu-
tation-based social capital allows firms to self-insure against external 
shocks in the absence of a State to provide reliable protection.169 
Here it may be useful to note Antonio Gramsci’s influential 
formulation of the nature of power that distinguishes between domi-
nation and hegemony.170  For Gramsci, domination represents the 
power of dictation, that of giving commands backed by sanction or 
some punishment so as to extract compliance in some explicit fash-
ion.  Hegemony, by contrast, is a sort of power of persuasion, one 
that is fundamentally embedded in consciousness without the need 
for such commands but significant exactly because it does not require 
such explicit expression.171 
It may be posited that corporations undertaking quasi-
governmental tasks pursue, whether consciously or otherwise, this 
latter form of power, or hegemony, as Gramsci might call it.  They 
may not dictate that the fragile State should follow a particular course 
of action, since that sort of domination might attract negative atten-
tion based on notions of democratic illegitimacy or improper inter-
ference.  However, the company’s own performance of the State may 
serve to create a locus of power or social capital in the attitude of the 
populace and decisionmakers toward the firm that is important and 
might later be exploited to the firm’s advantage. 
An example drawn from Firestone’s Ebola response might 
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serve to illustrate this point.  One of the fundamental challenges 
health workers and global officials faced in containing the Ebola epi-
demic was popular suspicion of the State and the various aid organi-
zations that eventually arrived to support the State’s efforts.  People 
would not inform health workers when a relative was ill for fear of 
mandatory isolation, and so the virus would spread.172  Consequently, 
according to one subsequent analysis, “the trust issues Liberians had 
for the government and international aid groups . . . developed into 
an active avoidance of aid groups and ETCs [Ebola Treatment Cen-
ters] in many communities.”173 
However, researchers assessing Firestone’s more effective re-
sponse made clear that this outcome was due not only to Firestone’s 
greater healthcare capacity relative to nearby public sector facilities.  
Instead, researchers found that “[a]n important result of Firestone’s 
response is the success with which community members identified 
suspected Ebola cases, agreed to voluntary quarantine in dedicated 
facilities, and minimized stigmatization of Ebola survivors.”174  In-
deed, they affirmed that “[s]ome community members self-reported 
signs and symptoms of Ebola, encouraged in part by community ra-
dio messages and educational meetings, as well as by high communi-
ty acceptance of the quarantine and patient treatment facilities.”175 
To be clear, the suggestion is not that Firestone employees 
and their families trusted Firestone more than Liberians at large trust-
ed the government.  Instead, it is an example of the operation of heg-
emonic power.  Domination by dictating to families that they report 
sick relatives or volunteer for quarantine may have caught some cas-
es of Ebola, but it would not have been as effective as cultivating a 
willingness among workers and their families to self-report.  And this 
willingness was based not merely on coercion or dominance but also 
on confidence or hegemony with respect to the capability of Fire-
stone’s health system to respond effectively.  And Firestone itself 
 
 172. See Saliou Samb & Adam Bailes, As Ebola Stalks West Africa, Medics Fight 
Mistrust, Hostility, REUTERS (July 14, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-
ebola-westafrica/as-ebola-stalks-west-africa-medics-fight-mistrust-hostility-
idUSKBN0FI0P520140714?feedType=RSS [https://perma.cc/HQU6-PVPY]; Sara Jerving, 
Why Liberians Thought Ebola Was a Government Scam to Attract Western Aid:  Decades of 
Corruption Left Liberians Suspicious of Their Government, THE NATION (Sept. 16, 2014), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/why-liberians-thought-ebola-was-government-scam-
attract-western-aid/ [https://perma.cc/JTA6-E7HV]. 
 173. Hannah Grace Southall et al., Lack of Cultural Competency in International Aid 
Responses:  The Ebola Outbreak in Liberia, 5 FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH 1, 3 (2017). 
 174. Reaves et al., supra note 9, at 964. 
 175. Id. at 963. 
                                                          
268 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [57:221 
benefited by ensuring that its business operations were able to con-
tinue despite the catastrophe unfolding in the rest of the country. 
On this account, we might think of hegemony as stemming 
not from allegiance or agreement with the entity but from the busi-
ness’ capacity or ability to discharge the sorts of tasks ordinarily ex-
pected of the dysfunctional government.  The ability of private actors 
to accumulate power through hegemony and the inability of the failed 
or fragile State to exercise power through either hegemony or domi-
nance is a sociological dynamic of estrangement from public institu-
tions that is important not merely for scholars of fragile and failed 
States but also for legal scholars generally.176 
Indeed, the State’s sovereignty is often construed as depend-
ent on its ability to exercise power through dominance or hegemo-
ny.177  When the State is unable to exercise power in either sense, the 
locus of that sovereignty entitlement may be subject to question. 
This is not to suggest that the private actors detailed in this 
Article are in any way sovereign in the way that we might expect 
from a State.  Indeed, such private actors are not constituted with the 
purpose of bearing and performing sovereignty in the same way as 
States.  They do not bear fiduciary obligations to the citizens of the 
territories in which they operate, and this foreignness or seeming lack 
of any duty of loyalty or care toward such communities may give 
reason for concern.178 
However, their accumulation of social capital through the per-
formance of the State may lead to the accrual of an important attrib-
ute of statehood that justifies the term semi-State as more than mere-
ly a conceptual tool for reformed analysis but also a category of 
business asset important for the firm to ensure its own survival and 
profit.  As such, the performance of quasi-State tasks by the firm may 
itself be categorized as an element of profit if it allows the firm to be 
accorded a portion of the authority or legitimacy ordinarily associat-
ed with the absent State.179 
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C. Entrenchment and Illegitimacy 
This subsection flags reasons for hesitation before recogniz-
ing certain firms as semi-States or encouraging their associated activ-
ities.  The term has thus far been utilized as an analytical device to 
allow for the application of theoretical insights at the convergence of 
international law and business theory.  But, if the account proves per-
suasive, the term may serve to germinate a new socio-legal category.  
Indeed, in some places, people have almost come to expect the com-
pletion of such tasks by a particular firm in the manner that citizens 
of developed countries may be seen to demand such performance of 
governmental institutions.180  But, though they may be willing to 
benefit from the social capital inherent in that recognition, these 
firms do not necessarily aspire to the imposition of quasi-legal obli-
gations that may come as a consequence of the global recognition of 
such a role. 
Yet, there may be deeper reasons for hesitation before accord-
ing recognition to for-profit firms as “semi-States” as an established 
legal category.  If the State were functional, presumably the State 
could also exercise a regulatory function over such firms, imposing 
potentially expensive standards and requirements for commercial ac-
tivities, products, and transactions.  Without the regulatory function 
of the State, the firm is able to do as it likes, to the extent allowed by 
the extraterritorial legislation of its home State.  It is for this reason 
that one observes in some States a degree of seeming competition be-
tween powerful business interests and nascent attempts to build a 
consensus State, with firms courted to ensure they do not defeat the 
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nascent State for fear of eventual regulation.181 
Moreover, the social capital accumulated by firms discharg-
ing quasi-State functions may allow for a degree of market en-
trenchment that will in the long-run concern advocates of the ad-
vantages of broader competition.  Thus, though the fact that Digicel’s 
social initiatives have been linked to brand profile that in turn led it 
to corner 70% of the Haitian mobile phone market may be seen as 
something of an advertisement for the benefits of intensive corporate 
social responsibility programs, the other side of that data point is a 
concern as to monopolistic behavior at the eventual expense of the 
very citizens Digicel purports to be advantaging. 
Finally, as John Ruggie points out with respect to this sphere 
of firm activity, any push to impose obligations on such firms could 
potentially be to the detriment of the firm, the State, and the people.  
Ruggie’s critique is sufficiently significant here that it deserves quo-
tation at some length.  He observes, in the context of whether the 
general power or demonstrated functionality of firms should lead to 
the imposition of international legal obligations, that: 
[T]he proposition that corporate human rights respon-
sibilities as a general rule should be determined by 
companies’ capacity, whether absolute or relative to 
States, is troubling.  On that premise, a large and prof-
itable company operating in a small and poor country 
could soon find itself called upon to perform ever-
expanding social and even governance functions—
lacking democratic legitimacy, diminishing the State’s 
incentive to build sustainable capacity and undermin-
ing the company’s own economic role and possibly its 
commercial viability.  Indeed, the proposition invites 
undesirable strategic gaming in any kind of country 
context.182 
To be clear, this Article does not suggest nor recommend the imposi-
tion of an obligation to carry out the quasi-governmental functions on 
corporations outlined above.  It neither endorses the extension of the 
responsibility-to-protect principle in international law to corporations 
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nor seeks to invoke the vast business law literature on the moral or 
ethical duty of rescue.183  Instead, it simply examines the implica-
tions of the voluntary discharge by firms of these activities. 
However, once that simple distinction with regard to Ruggie’s 
statement is highlighted, the other points inherent in his observation 
are of concern for the account articulated.  Certainly, to the extent 
that the provision of public goods by private actors thwarts or other-
wise disincentivizes the government from undertaking these tasks, 
that may appear to be a significant challenge.  But this phenomenon 
ought to be of concern only if it is generally accepted that the firms 
involved here do an inferior job to the government or if it is demon-
strated that it is otherwise preferable for the government to undertake 
such activities.  Thus, inherent in Ruggie’s statement is either an as-
sumption that the private sector will not provide service in a manner 
as competent as the public sector or that there ought to be some other 
bias in favor of the functionality of a Western-style, Weberian State 
able to perform all functions demanded of it by its citizens.  But the 
reality in many parts of the world is that such a State is lacking and 
so alternatives must be considered.  Moreover, even developed States 
regularly privatize certain governance functions.  There are, of 
course, concerns as to the seeming democratic deficit involved in the 
processes of decisionmaking undertaken by business actors, and so 
these must be acknowledged.184  However, it may also be argued that 
the primary question ought to be whether the service provision, both 
in terms of quality and in terms of coverage, is equivalent to that 
which could or might be provided by the State. 
There are, of course, a range of NGOs and international or-
ganizations operating in such settings, such that the choice is not such 
a stark one between for-profit firms and the host State.  Yet, these 
other actors sometimes themselves also fall short in both service pro-
vision and in the model of service undertaken. 
In Haiti, for example, a massive earthquake in 2010 caused 
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vast human suffering, eviscerated large swaths of infrastructure, and 
severely reduced government capacity.  Haiti had experienced signif-
icant governance challenges before, but the earthquake was an un-
precedented disaster.185  Thereafter, donations poured in to assist sur-
vivors and rebuild the country, and NGOs largely filled the void left 
by the recovering State.  Indeed, such foreign NGOs became so 
ubiquitous that Haiti came to be known as the “republic of NGOs.”186 
Yet, commentators have begun to question where the money 
has gone.187  Infrastructure still suffers from severe deficiencies, 
many buildings have not been rebuilt, and widespread poverty per-
sists.  Moreover, a U.N. peacekeeping operation deployed shortly af-
ter the earthquake introduced cholera to the island, thereby causing 
over 9,000 deaths, and then relied on the organization’s legal immun-
ity to thwart victims’ calls for compensation.188  Additionally, the 
earthquake’s destruction and the cholera epidemic that followed con-
tributed to the fact that an overwhelming majority of Haitians now 
procure even their water from private companies.189  Finally, even 
the subsistence model of much charitable and U.N. aid provision has 
been criticized as out of step with the aspirations of the Haitian peo-
ple to forge a more autonomous means of recovery.  Indeed, in the 
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aftermath of the earthquake, some local ventures commandeered or 
diverted subsistence aid from NGOs toward more entrepreneurial en-
deavors as a means of long-term viability.190 
As such, democratic legitimacy may be a concern not merely 
for for-profit firms but also for the range of NGO and international 
organization actors providing public goods in fragile and failed 
States.  However, we ought also to see democratic legitimacy not 
merely in terms of process or elections, since public disaffection with 
the lack of State capacity may lead to minimal participation in such 
electoral processes.191  Instead, it is important to think through the 
extent to which the approach of the actors involved aligns with the 
aspirations of the populace.  Where locals seek to exploit entrepre-
neurial opportunities, the presence of business actors may more 
closely align with such aspirations than the activities of charitable, 
non-profit organizations, potentially problematizing simplistic no-
tions of which actors are in fact giving closest expression to the 
wishes of the people. 
What is clear is that the political situation in failed and fragile 
States is far from ideal.192  The violence and upheaval that often mark 
such places is well documented.  Yet, this Article suggests that an 
understanding of the discharge of government functions or the pos-
session of sovereignty that is the progenitor of the obligation to un-
dertake such tasks need not be understood in exclusive terms with the 
State at the pinnacle of a hierarchical model.  Instead, it may be more 
constructive to think of sovereignty in conglomerate terms, with its 
component attributes discharged by multiple actors in socially bene-
ficial fashion when the State is absent.193  However, the realization of 
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such a model with respect to for-profit firms may face certain legal 
obstacles that the next section seeks to address. 
IV. LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This section highlights how law can make it more difficult for 
for-profit firms to operate in failed and fragile States.  In so doing, it 
builds on the account’s descriptive and theoretical discussion of the 
constructive potential of such firms in challenging environments and 
seeks to apply these insights to the governing legal regime that often 
thwarts such activities. 
The materials highlighted include U.S. domestic law with ex-
traterritorial reach and international law in the form of the newly 
proposed U.N. draft treaty on business and human rights.  The ac-
count is not exhaustive but is instead meant to be indicative of the 
implications that may be derived from the foregoing account. 
The section concludes by extending the analysis to processes 
of transnational decisionmaking. Accordingly, it discusses how the 
Article’s account might affect and implicate not only existing rules 
but also the formulation and application of law in the face of new 
policy challenges. 
A. Anti-Corruption and Anti-Money Laundering 
For decades, the prevailing economic wisdom has been that 
State corruption through the payment of bribes to officials is harmful 
to economic development and stunts the formation of sound institu-
tions of domestic governance.194  Moreover, concerned about such 
practices spilling over into domestic politics in the aftermath of the 
Watergate Scandal, the United States adopted the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act in 1977 to prohibit American companies from paying 
bribes to foreign officials.195  The legislation has subsequently been 
extended through the Dodd-Frank Act to require issuers operating in 
the extractive industries (such as companies drilling for oil, natural 
gas, or other minerals) to report payments to foreign government of-
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ficials.196  And, though the FCPA lay un- or under-enforced for many 
years, recent enforcement actions against companies operating in 
emerging markets indicate a significant uptick in the utilization of the 
Act.197  Moreover, other States have also adopted significant anti-
corruption measures, with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the 
U.N. Convention against Corruption, and the African Union Conven-
tion on Preventing and Combating Corruption among the most prom-
inent international instruments.198 
Yet, much commentary has also been focused on the poten-
tially deleterious effects of these measures on firms doing business in 
fragile States.199  Other scholars have pushed back against this cri-
tique of anti-corruption measures, arguing variously that corrupt ac-
tivity ought to be regarded by international law as a human rights 
violation because of the way it harms the citizenry at large, or assert-
ing that anti-corruption measures do not as an empirical matter deter 
very many firms.200 
This Article does not seek to resolve the debate concerning 
the virtues or detriments of the various anti-corruption regimes that 
States have adopted writ large.  Instead, it seeks to add nuance to the 
application of these statutes by decisionmakers to for-profit firms by 
expanding our understanding of the actors and beneficiaries impacted 
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by these legislative pronouncements in the context of economic de-
velopment in fragile States. 
Indeed, though the prohibition on bribes might be seen as a 
way of regulating the conduct of business overseas and ensuring the 
compliance of government officials in such countries, the imposition 
of penalties upon companies that run afoul of such provisions may 
make it significantly more expensive and risky to operate in such ju-
risdictions.201  Thus, companies may wish to avoid the risk of doing 
business in such locales altogether or may have less capital available 
to expend on some of the socially beneficial activities outlined in 
Part I.  Of course, some companies may persist.  But the potential of 
sanction is likely to drive out a segment of risk-averse firms. 
In any case, the Article’s account in this area suggests that 
prosecutors enforcing anti-corruption measures ought to be more 
mindful of the indirect consequences of such settlements.  Monetary 
penalties imposed may harm not merely the company’s management 
or its shareholders but also the various people in communities in 
which the firm operates as a semi-State.  Consequently, local prose-
cutors may be conceptualized as global governance actors, and their 
enforcement of domestic legislation may also impact and impede the 
attainment of developmental objectives of citizens in foreign States.  
In this respect, though there is little express international law that 
might directly regulate or restrain such activities, officials in other 
branches of government ought to take such international implications 
into account in restructuring the operation and application of these 
anti-corruption measures. 
A similar pattern is witnessed in the various anti-money laun-
dering regimes.  Some companies have been subject to hefty penal-
ties, while others have been ordered to stop doing business in particu-
lar emerging markets altogether.202  Much of the concern 
underpinning the anti-money laundering regimes relates to the infil-
tration of dark money or illicit commercial activity into the financial 
operations of banking and other fiscal entities operating in weak 
States.  Yet, to the extent that such anti-money laundering regulations 
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force banks and other financial institutions either to exit fragile States 
or completely avoid such potentially risky markets, they may defeat 
some of the development objectives of for-profit firms that otherwise 
might wish to operate there to the potential benefit of the local com-
munity. 
B. The New U.N. Draft Treaty on Business and Human Rights 
As the culmination of the long-running project to reconcile 
the power and increasing capacity of business actors with their uncer-
tain place in the framework of international law, the U.N. Human 
Rights Council undertook in 2014 to draft a new treaty defining the 
legal relationship between business entities and the superstructure of 
international human rights law.203  Accordingly, in July 2018, the 
Council’s Intergovernmental Working Group released its first draft of 
this new treaty, the so-called Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, 
in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises.204  The draft treaty has 
elicited much comment, but this subsection focuses on one particular-
ly pertinent and problematic section. 
In its current form, Article 10 of the draft treaty defines vari-
ous aspects of criminal and civil liability to be attributable to busi-
ness entities.205  Article 10(6) mandates liability “to the extent [the 
business] exercises control over the operations” in a manner that few 
apart from the most ardent international law purists would find con-
troversial.206  Yet, that same article also allows for liability “to the 
extent risk have [sic] been foreseen or should have been foreseen of 
human rights violations within its chain of economic activity.”207 
Unfortunately, however, “chain of economic activity” is not a 
term of art in international law, and the drafters have given little 
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guidance as to its expected meaning.  Indeed, though some might as-
sume that it merely means “supply chain,” that term is instead used 
elsewhere in Article 10 to ascribe liability on the basis of activity of a 
business’s subsidiary or “entity in its supply chain” with whom 
“there is strong and direct connection between its conduct and the 
wrong suffered by the victim.”208 
Moreover, for the sorts of for-profit firms discussed earlier 
that undertake fairly expansive functions in fragile States, the term 
“chain of economic activity” may well have the effect of encompass-
ing activities or persons well outside the circle that the business 
might reasonably be able to control or whose actions it might be able 
to predict.  Without further guidance, risk-averse companies may 
well either avoid such activities or avoid fragile States altogether. 
Indeed, if anything, the provision gives such business entities 
added incentive to tighten their circle of associations when operating 
in fragile States so as to minimize the risk of possible liability if one 
of these people or activities turns out to violate the human rights of a 
member of the local community. 
Furthermore, this version of Article 10 appears to build on an 
earlier failed attempt at U.N.-initiated treaty-making in this area of 
international law, namely the U.N.’s Norms on the Responsibilities 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights first promulgated in 2003.209  The draft 
norms mandated that within their “spheres of activity and influence,” 
business entities “have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfil-
ment of, ensure respect of and protect human rights.”210  Yet, as with 
Article 10 of the new draft treaty, the drafters of the Norms did not 
define “spheres of activity and influence.” 
It seems instead that a fundamental problem that global poli-
cymakers and firms operating in this area have to grapple with is that 
of complicity.  To what extent is the presence of business in a failed 
State itself complicit or otherwise likely contributing to the turmoil 
therein?  In various settings, the answer will be different, and one ob-
jective of this Article has been to show that the answer need not al-
ways be the same.  Moreover, international law lacks a nuanced or 
tailored doctrine of complicity specific to each of its subfields, in-
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stead preferring a one-size-fits-all model that may be ill-suited to 
capturing the complexities of the fragile State paradigm.211 
Further, we must understand complicity both in its legal sense 
and in terms of its potential for reputational or social harm.  Conse-
quently, to the extent that the new draft treaty opens up a quasi-legal 
avenue for civil society groups or activists to criticize for-profit firms 
operating in failed States on the basis of harms tangentially connect-
ed to these firms, such firms will likely avoid operating in such envi-
ronments, thereby depriving inhabitants of the potential economic 
development that might ensue.  Indeed, as John Ruggie presciently 
observed in one of his first reports on the relationship between busi-
ness and human rights, “companies cannot be held responsible for the 
human rights impacts of every entity over which they may have some 
leverage, because this would include cases in which they are not con-
tributing to, nor are a causal agent of the harm in question.”212 
There is a balance to be struck, surely, and the treaty ought 
not to be so forgiving as to tolerate direct violations of human rights 
committed by the company itself.  However, to the extent that the 
current formulation of the treaty allows for claims of complicity to be 
marshalled in a legal or quasi-legal manner, the draft treaty may work 
to create a degree of uncertainty or almost incalculable risk for for-
profit firms acting as semi-States in settings of State failure and may 
well inhibit what could potentially be socially constructive business 
activity. 
C. Universal Health Coverage and the U.N.’s 2030 Development 
Goals 
In 2015, member States of the United Nations collectively 
pledged to attain Universal Health Coverage (“UHC”) for the world’s 
population by 2030.213  Since then, a battle royale has raged over 
whether the international community ought to pursue this ambitious 
objective by increasing the capacity of State-based institutions to de-
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liver healthcare, or whether donors ought instead to prioritize funding 
for private-sector health services providers.  The position of those in 
favor of building State-based institutions is aptly summarized by 
former U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who contended in a re-
cent speech that “you simply cannot reach universal health coverage 
if your health system is dominated by private financing,” because 
such actors “prioritize profit over care.”214  On the other side of the 
debate, the World Bank has consistently endorsed private-sector 
healthcare funding and, in December 2017, Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe announced his country’s intention to donate $2.9 billion 
to facilitate the delivery of healthcare by private providers in devel-
oping countries.215  Thus, as Richard Horton and Stephanie Clark ob-
served in a timely article in The Lancet, “Few issues provoke as 
much disagreement, even anger, as the question of the private sec-
tor’s role in delivering health care.”216 
This disagreement is particularly fraught in the context of 
failed and fragile States.217  In principle, international law demands 
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that these States guarantee the right to health of their citizens.218  
However, developing public-sector capacity to fulfill this legal obli-
gation is tremendously difficult in practice because of weaknesses in 
the States’ institutions.219  Yet, endorsing private sector healthcare 
delivery in such States is controversial because of the suspicion that 
profit-motivated actors will engage in exploitative conduct unless the 
State restrains them.  This tension still frames much of the debate.220 
Many healthcare systems eventually end up being comprised 
of a combination of public and private entities, but the willingness of 
some to embrace such private healthcare providers is based on the 
function of the State as a regulatory backdrop.  However, this Article 
has sought to show that even when the State is seemingly absent, as 
in the context of failed and fragile States, private entities may take on 
significant quasi-governmental functions, including healthcare, in an 
effective manner. 
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CONCLUSION 
For-profit firms in failed and fragile States sometimes them-
selves act like semi-States.  They perform the State, discharging 
functions ordinarily expected of governments in fundamentally chal-
lenging situations.  Yet, legal scholars have often overlooked this 
phenomenon. 
The Article has highlighted the impressive response of Fire-
stone during Liberia’s Ebola outbreak and the various other quasi-
governmental actions undertaken by business entities in fragile States 
so as to add nuance and expand our understanding of the policy op-
tions available to global decisionmakers facing such situations.  The 
Article has constructed an alternate model based on the accumulation 
of reputation as a means of investment or insurance against future 
uncertainty to explain the observed behavior of firms discharging 
quasi-State functions in settings of State dysfunction.  Applying this 
model, it has also suggested alternative legal and policy formulations 
through which the international community might better encourage 
and facilitate such business actors, while also acknowledging reasons 
for concern. 
As transnational corporations become increasingly wealthy 
and powerful and the challenge of State failure persists, international 
law must grapple with how business entities may contribute construc-
tively.  Although corporations have a problematic history as interna-
tional actors within the enterprise of European colonialism, the posi-
tive contributions of for-profit firms when States do not or cannot 
perform core functions today represent another avenue through which 
the international community might work to transcend the conse-
quences of that legacy.  As such, the Article suggests that versions of 
sovereign hybridity that combine public and private entities discharg-
ing State-like functions or providing public goods ought to be exam-
ined more seriously when States fail. 
